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Europe,"  organized  by the Woodrow  Wilson  Center  in Sofia,  Bulgaria  in September,  1991. I am
indebted  to Zeljko  Dogetic,  Lawrence  Brainard,  William  McCleary,  Fabrizio  Coricelli,  Manuel  Hinds,
Colin  Maver,  Roberto  de Rezende  Rocha  and  John Wilton  for very  useful  discussions  anJ
comments.A. INTRODUCTION
The reform of the financial system Is a key aspect of the overall ecor.omic  transformation
process  undertaken  by the former centrally-planned  Eastern  European  countries.  In the short term
this reform should contribute to the stabilization  objective by providing the authorities additional
instruments for managing  monetary policy and controlling inflationary pressures,  while in the
medium term it should enhance  the supply response  by improving the allocation  of resources.
However and unlike other developing  countries, this is not a simple task for the former centrally-
planned Eastern  European  countries. It is only a slight exaggeration  to say that in these countries
reforming the financial system consists of creating a financial system frorn scratch.  Most of these
countries inherited  financial systems  geared  to the needs of a centrally-planned  economy, which
are different from the needs  of a market-economy.
This paper is an attempt to illustrate the type of problems  that Eastern  European  countries
face in reforming  their financial systems. This is done by using the case  of Bu:;aria to illustrate
the initial conditions.  Only by focusing on the experience  of a particular  country can one fully
understand  the problems  inherited by tnese economies  and make specific propo@als  for their
solution.  In this paper I argue that the Bulgaria,  and other Eastern  European  countries, should
enhance  the supply response  by reforming their financial systems.  This reform can contribute to
this purpose if the authorities: (i) link the financial sector reform to the enterprise and banks'
privatization; (ii) quickly privatize a group of banks; (iii  encoursqe  privatized banks to lend
exclusively  to the emerging  private sector;  and (iv} tum the rest of banks  into investment banks
and make them participate in the process  of restructuring and privatization of state-owned
enterprises. This should stimulate the s,upp;; respciose  by providing  the emerging  private sector
more access  to credit and by increasini;  the sevings deposited  in the financial system.
Sections B and C focus on the case  of Bulgaria. Section B describes  the financial system
as it was at end-1  990 and identifies the structural problems  inherited; and Section C describes  the
Government's  financial sector measures  taken up through June 1991.  Section D focuses on
alternative approaches  for dealing  with the structural problems  as well as their pros and cons. This
provides  a framework for using the financial system to enhance  the supply response. The last
section is devoted to the conclusions. Annex 1 discusses  the problems  with the data used.
B. THE CURRENT  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  AND STRUCTURAL  ISSUES.
This section briefly discusses  the current financial system, then identifies the most-2-
important structural issues,  and finally discusses  the issues  in resource allocation, which are the
allocation  of credit and monetary overhang.
B.1  The Current iinanJal  Svstem
By end-1  990, the Bulgarian  financial system consisted  of the National Bank of Bulgaria
(NBB),  the State and Savings Bank (SSB),  the Bulgarian  Foreign  Trade Bank (BFTB),  eight
specialized  commercial  banks (SCB),  59 common  commercial  banks (CCB)  and two private common
commercial  banks (the First Private Bank  ard the Agriculture and Credit Bank). All banks  were
established  as shareholding  companies  and  were licensed  to operate as universal  banks.  Except  for
the two private banks, the banks  were either owned by the NBB, the BFTB  or public sector
enterprises.  Only eleven  banks (seven SCBs,  the BFTB,  Stroybank and Bulgarsoinvest)  were
authorized  to open accounts and contract loans  directly with foreign banks, and although CCBs  can
accept foreign exchange  deposits, they had  to re-sell  them to BFTB  for the lev equivalent.
Before 1981 the financial system consisted  of the NPB, the BFTB  and the SSB. The NBB,
in addition to its duties as central bank, also provided  finance and accepted deposits from the
enterprise and the Government  sectors. The BFTB  specialized  in foreign exchange  transactions
which included contracting, on behalf of the Government,  foreign loans with foreign banks,
accepting foreign exchange  deposits and managing  the foreign exchange  reserves.  It provided
loans to finance Bulgarian  exports and provided pre-financing  to importers and exporters. The
BFTB  was also responsible  for administering  the foreign exchange  regulations  and was the
authorized ager! in the relations with the former CMEA  countries.  The SSB was created as a
specialized  bank  - dervicing  the household  sector.  It accepted households  deposits, granted
consumer  and hc,. )ing loans as well as providing  other bank services  geared  to households  such as
organizing  the state lottery.  In addition, the SSB  was a net provider of funds to the system by
depositing its excess  funds with NBB.
Changes  started in 1981.  First in 1981 the authorities created  the Mineral Bank as a
shareholding  company with the objective of providing  finance to the enterprise  sector above the
targets set in the plan and for projects not included in the financial plan. In 1987, the NBB
established  seven  specialized  banks  and transferred  most of its investment portfolio to them and
the Mineral Bank, thus creating a two-tier banking  system.  These  seven banks  plus the Mineral
Bank, which make up the eight SCB,  specialized  in a particular sub-sector  and in long-term
investment finance.  In May 1989, the NBB adopted  further changes,  which took effect only in
early 1990.  These  changes  entailed the creation of 59 commercial  banks  out of NBB's  formet-3-
branches  and the selling of the rest of NBB's  branches  to the commercial  banks. Also, the two-tier
banking  system was abolished,  and all banks were allowed to function as universal banks. This
enabled banks  to provide short- and long-term  loans, accept deposits from individuals  and
enterprises,  and grant housing  and consumer  loans  to individuals. All banks were transformed into
shareholding  companies  and the NBB  started selling  its bank shares  to public sector enterprises.
The changes  leading  to the creation of both SCBs  and CCBs  implied a large  transf6: of
resources  from the NBB  to the SCBs  and CCBs. In 1987, the NBB  created the SCBs  by transferring
the equivalent  of 33 percent of GDP in enterprise  sector assets and by granting loans equivalent  to
36 percent of GDP. As a result, NBB's enterprise  sector assets fell from 89 percent of GDP  in
1986 to 51 percent in 1987.  Similarlv, in 1990 the NBB  created  the 59 CCBs  by transferring 40
percent  of GCP :n enterprise  sector assets, 22 percent of GDP  in demand deposits and granted
loans equivalent  to 20 percent of GDP. As a result, NBB's  enterprise  sector assets fell from 51
percent of GDP  in December  1989 to 0 percent in March 1990 and demand  deposits fell from 26
percent  of GDP  in Decomber  1989 to 0 percent in March 1990.  However, the SCBs  and the CCBs
were created with no additional infusion of capital.
B.2  Structural Issues
The creation of the SCBs  and CCBs  and the conversion  to universal banking  allowed greater
competition among banks  but, in fact, little was changed. SCBs  started diversifying their lending
into different sectors other than the one they were established  for and into short term lending; and
CCBs  started attracting more deposits and diversifying their lending. NBB  in an attempt to diversify
CCBs' and SCBs'  ownership started selling  these banks shares  to public sector enterprises. But, in
spite of the Government  efforts to diversify the structure of the financial system and to enhance
competition  and banks' initial response,  the financial system changed  very little and problems
remained.
What follows is a brief description of the nine most salient structural issues  the financial
system was experiencing  at the end of 1990, that is, before  the authorities started the reform of
the financial system.' These issues  are summarized  in Tables 1 and 2.
(i) Segmentation. The financial  system was segmented  both in terms of size (deposits,
.1/ Despite  the Government's  recent measures,  most of these structural issues  still remain. Currenly,  the authorities  are
discussing  the strategy for reforming  the financial  sVstem..4-
capital and assets)  and areas  of specialization  (see  Table 1) . The pre-1987 segmentation, despite
the measures  undertaken  for diversification, still prevailed. NBB  was the largest bank, accounting
for 23 percent of total assets and for 57 percent of total capital; SSB  was specialized  in the
housing  sector and accounted for 46 percent of the deposits; and BFTB  was specialized  in foreign
exchange  transactions  and accounted for 93 percent of total foreign exchanoe liabilities.  In
contrast, SCBs  and CCBs  accounted for a very small proportion of the banking  business  and lacked
independence. They were fully owned and controlled by the NBB. Moreover,  while the SSB
accounted  for most of the deposits, mostly from households,  only a portion were used to finance
mortgages. The NBB used  them to fund the SCBs  and CCBs.
Table  1:  Liabilities  and  Assets  by  Group  of  Banks,  as  of  1990
(As  Percentage  of  Total)
Sources of  Funds  Assets
--- --  ---  --  --  ---  --  - . . . . --  --  . - . --  ---  . - --  .....................  .....  .....  ....  ............. 
Deposits  Central NBB's Credits  i  Capital  Other  Total  Net of
1; . Govt's Credits  Foreign  4/  Net  Clearing
Credits  2/  Exchange  3/  5/  6/
Nationat  Bank  of  Bulgaria,  IB8  15.8X  O.OX  0.0  0.0  56.5X  12.0C  23.7K  20.5X
Strte  and  Savings  Bank,  SSB  46.2X  1.5X  0.0  0.1X  2.8X  4.0  13.3K  13.9K
Bulgarian  Foreign  Trade  Bank,  BTFS  10.1X  3.1X  1.2K  93.6X  13.1X  64.7K  23.5X  24.4X
specialized  Coamercial  Banks,  SC8 11.2K  1.0  60.8X  6.3X  16.1K  32.0X  15.1K  15.7%
Cmnmon  Come  rciat  Banks, CCB  16.8K  94.5K  38.0X  0.0K  11.4X  -12.7X  24.5X  25.5X
of  which:
Largest  5  7/  4A.4X  n.a.  31.8K  n.a.  di.6K  n.a.  56.3X
Smallest  5  7/  1.0K  n.a.  0.6K  n.a.  3.4K  n.a.  0.7K
,.........._.  .__  ..  ...  ..... ,....  ........  ................  _..............  .................  ......................................  .
SOURCE:  National  Bank  of  Bulgaria,  Monetary  Survey.
Notes:  (1)  In  the  case of  NBB, consists  of  currency  outside  banks and time,  savings  and foreign  currency
deposits;  and for  the  otner  banks consist  of:  demand; time,  savings  and foreign  currency;  and import  and
restricted  deposits.  Total  CCB's  deposits  exclude  Municipalities'  demand  deposits  in  line  with  IMF's
methodological  guidelines  for  1990 Monetary Survey estimates.  (2)  Consists  of  both  NBB's loans  to  banks
recorded  in  the  Monotary Survey as "Credit  from National  Bank" and  in  "Other  Liabilities;"  and  exclude
NB's  loans for  the  purpose of  the  clearing  system. (3)  Excludes foreign  currency  deposits.  (4)  Define as
the  paid-in  capital  and exctudes non-capitalized  retain  profits  and reserves.  (5)  Defined as  the  item
the  Monetary  Survey's  item  "Others  Items,  Net"  and  excludes  NBB  a  loans  to  CCB  and  SCB  and  the  valuation
effect  of  foreign  exchange loans granted,  in  the  case of  BFTS.  Both of  these are  classify  in  "Other  Ite-,
Net"  in  the  Monetary Survey.  The v2luation  effect  is  recorded in  "Other  accounts receivable."  (6)  Exclude
"Other  Assets"  which  mainly  consist  of  the  outstanding  amounts  in  the  clearing  system.  (7)  Indicates  the
proportion  concentrated  by  the  largest  (smallest)  five  banks.  Largest  (and  smallest)  five  banks  are
defined  in  relation  to  each  variable,  e.g.,  deposits,  capital,  assets.
{ii) Concentration. The three largest banks  held most of the assets, deposits and capital,
while the 67 commercial  banks held only a very small share  of assets, deposits and capital.  In
fact, the Bulgarian  financial system was characterized  by the coexistence  of very large banks
together with  very small banks.  NBB, SSB  and BFTB  (see  Table 1) held 24, 13 and 23 percent of
total assets; 16, 46 and 10 percent of total deposits; 3nd 56, 3 and 13 percent of total capital,
respectively. In contrast and on average, each SCB  accounted for 1.8 of total assets, 1.4 percent
of total deposits and 2 percent of total capital; and each CCB  accounted  for 0.4 percent of total
assets, 0.6 percent of total deposits and 0.2 of total capital. Concentration  is also a problem
within the CCBs. The la.gest five banks in terms of deposits held 44 percent of total CCBs.5-
deposits and the smallest  five held only 1 percent of total CCBs  deposits. The situation is similar
witi1 assets and capital.  The largest  6  CCBs  in terms of assets and capital held 56 and 25 percent
of CCBs' total assets and capihal;  and the smallest  five held 0.6 and 3.4 percent, respectively. 2
(iii) Reliance  on NB's  credits.  A key feature of the financial system was SCBs  and CCBs
reliance  on NBB  credit.  This resulted in an odd situation: NBB  had to borrow SSBs' excess  deposits
to provide SCBs  and CCBs  with the necessary  funds for their lending.  However, as will be
explained  in more detail later, interest rates had very little to do with this distortion. This resulted
from the way in which NBB  established  these banks--by  transferring both its loan portfolio and the
necessary  finance.  This kind of reliance indicates  that banks  have accomplished  little in terms of
diversifying their sources  of funds (see  Table 1). The eight SCBs  held 61 percent of total NBB
credits, and the 59 CCBs  held 38 percent. This reliance  can be measured  more accurately using
the ratio of total NBB  credit to total commercial  bank assets. On average, ScBs' ratio was F7
percent and C'.Bs' was 22 percent; of the eight SCBs,  six had a ratio greater than 30 percent, and
of the 59 CCBs, 23 had a ratio greater  than 30 percent. Moreover,  most of NBB's  credit to CCBs
was held by a few CCBs. For instance, 32 percent of NBB  credits to CCBs  was held by the largest
five CCBs  (in terms of NBBs  credits) and  the 0.6 percent by the smallest  five CCBs.
(iv) Branch concentration. Another important problem was the small number  of bank
branches  and their concentration. The number of bank branches  per inhabitant was sm:ll  when
compared  to countries with the same level of development. However, more important was that
these few bank branches  were owned by one bank: the SSB. The branch concentration nad, in
turn, contributed to SSB's deposit concentration  and to commercial  bank reliance on NBB's  credits
(see  Table 2).  SSB  owned 3,915 places of business  out of the financial system's total of 4,129;
and 242 branches  out of a total of 356.  In contrast and on average,  each SCB  owned 6 places  of
business  and 0 branches  and each  CCB  owned 3 places  of business  and 2 branches. An important
factor contributing to this was the design  of the post-1  987 changes. When both the SCBs  and the
CCB  were created, they were established  as banks without branches. And, since then the lack of
dynamic and independent  bank management  and the absence  of a real estate market have deterred
banks from increasing  the number  of branches.
(v) Inadequate  capital.  Bank capital was small relative to their volume of assets and, more
important, to their volume of non-performing  assets. Banks  had, on average, a ratio of capital to
risk assets of 5 percent. This ratio was well below the 8 percent recommended  by the Basle
2/ In fact,  one  CCB,  Sofia  Bank.  accounts  for  26 percent  of total  CCBs  deposits  end for  43 percent  of total  assets.-6-
agreement.  However,  this average  ratio  understated  the true extent  to which  banks  were
undercapitalized  because  while  the Basle  agreement  defines  assets  to exclude  non-performing
assets,  in Bulgaria  the asset  definition  included  the-n. And  in Bulgaria,  as will be  discussed  later,
banks  held  a larg' proportion  of non-performing  assets. Ratio  of capital  to risk assets  varied  among
banks. In general  and  excluding  the NBB,  the largest  banks  in terms  of assets  had  the lowest  ratio
(see  Table  2). The two largest  banks,  SSB  and  BFTB,  had  a ratio  of 1 and 3 percent,  respectively.
While  on average  SCBs  and CCBs  had  a ratio  of 5 and 2 percent  respectively,  five out of the eight
SCBs--which  accounted  for 80 percent  of SCBs'  assets--had  a ratio  below  5 percent;  and  the
largest  five CCBs  in terms of assets  had  a ratio  of less  than  0.9 percent.
Table  2: Financial  System's  Indicators,  as of 1990  1/
Gross  Operative  Wages  and
Number  cf:  Capital Profits Expenses Salaries
..............................................  .....  .........  .................  ......................  ......
Banks Places  Branches  to Asset  (As  Percentage
Business  Ratio  of  Total  Assets)
Nationat  lBnk  of  Bulgaria,  NBB  1  1  0  12.0X  1.22X  0.10X  0.05X
State  and  Savings  Bank,  SS8  1  3915  242  1.1X  1.03X  0.18X  0.10X
Bulgarian  Foreign  Trade  Bank,  BTFB  1  2  0  2.8X  3.51X  0.06X  0.92X
Specialized  Coamrcial Banks,  SCS  8  51  0  5.4X  1.22K  0.03X  0.01X
Common  Commercial  Banks,  CCB  59  160  114  2.3X
Of which:
Largest  5 2/  8.5K  5.0K  0.0  0.9%  n.a.  n.e.  n.a.
Smallest  5 2/  8.5K  3.1K  0.0K  10.9K  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Source:  National  Bank  of Bulgaria,  Monetary  Survey;  National  Banks  of Bulgaria,  Banks'
Supervision  Department;  and  B*nks.
Notes: (1)  Asset  data is  su'  sect  to  measurement  errors  (see  Annex 1),  however,  in this  table  it is
only  used  for  cowparative  purposes.  Assets  are defined  to include  outstanding  balances  in  the
clearing  system.  Asset  information  is  for  end-1989.  (2)  Indicates  the  proportion  concentrated  by  the
largest  (smllest)  five  banks.  Largest  (and  smallest)  five  banks  are  defined  In  terms  of
assets.
(vi) Profitability. Banks'  reported  profits, although  very high  by international  standards,
failed  to accurately  measure  bank  profitability  for two reasons. First,  recorded  profits  (see  Table  2)
were accrued,  thus including  interest  income  that has  not been  actually  paid. Second,  banks  were
not forced  to make  provisions  on loans  in arrears  and in moratorium.  Had  banks  had  to make
provisions  on these  loans,  their  profits  would  had  been  smaller. Bulgarian  banks  held  these  loans
without being  forced  to provision.  This  was  even  though  regulation  on bank  provisiuning  was  in
place  since  1987.  Until 1991, banks  were  not forced  to comply  with such  regulations  nor  to
classify  their  loans  according  to performance.
(vii)  Ownership.  Bank  ownership  in Bulgaria  was  characterized  by conflict  of interest  which
raises  certain  problems.  MEB  was  the major  shareholder  of SCBs  and CCBs.  Other  important
shareholders  were the BFTB  and  public  sector  enterprises.  NBB  ownership  of banks  posed  a-7-
problem  of conflict of interest because  NBB  was both owner and the institution responsible  for
supervising  and controlling these banks. To overcome  this difficulty, in 1990 NBB started selling
its sharca of these banks.  However, major buyers were the public sector enterprises  and other
banks  and these enterprises  were also major borrowers from these banks.  In many cases.
borrowers with problem loans bought banks' shares  to guarantee  continuous  access  to credit.
Banks  bought shares of each other to reduce  their dependence  on NBB. This public sector
enterprise  ownership of banks raised a problem of conflict of interest because  it limited banks'
ability to collect loans by exerting pressure  on borrowers.  (In other Socialist countries, such as
Yugoslavia,  this was a major factor explaining  the accumulation  of large losses  in banks. 3)  Loss  of
bank control by the NBB,  as a result of the sales of shares  to public sector enterprises  and banks,
poses  the problem  of "spontaneous" privatization. Although in principle there is nothing wrong
with banks' privatization, it is not desirable  to sell problem b?,iks to the private sector. This can
result in bank failure and thus undermine  private sector's confidence  in future privatization  efforts.
(viii) Payments  system.  Banks' checking  accounts were underdeveloped  and the system for
clearing  outstanding accounts took a very long time.4 Both of these problems  led to: (i) the use of
cash by individuals  and enterprises  as the means  of payment; and (ii) the accumulation of large
outstanding unsettled balances  between banks. The persistence  of large  outstanding balances  in
banks  resulted in an excessively  large stock of base money which was explained by the inefficiency
of the payment  system.  Large outstanding balances  can result .n inflationary pressures  if they turn
into currency. NBB started improving the payment  system by creating Bankservice,  a fully owned
subsidiary  in charge  uf the clearing system, but progress  was insufficient.
(ix) Management. Banks managers  lack the necessary  skills to manage  banks  in a market
economy. Most bankers were trained to manage  a bank in a system where the concept of risk and
return on assets and liabilities was absent. Bankers  were responsible  for executing orders  from the
N3B.  The transition to a market-economy  system requires  bankers capable  of assessing  risk and
the borrowers' ability to repay  their loans. This would require re-training  existing bankers  or
developing  the banking  profession or both.  For instance, SSB  and BFTB  bankers  can be turned into
professional  bankers  if some  training is provided.
3I See  do Rezende  Rocha  (1991).
4/ Estimates  indicate that a 'quick'  transaction  can take 15 daVs,  but others  take about a year.3.3  Issues in ResoErge  Allocatign
In Bulgaria,  the financial system played a very important role in sustaining tte  loss-making
enterprises  and in providing  finance to the public sector.  Th6se problems  are discussed  in this
section by analyzing  the (i) credit policy and the role of the public s-cor;  and {ii} monetary
overhang  and monetary policy.
B.3.1  Credit Foligy and tne Role  of Public Sector
Until 1989, credit al!ocation was deteimined by the Financial  Plan. (,.edit policy was
determined  by the needs of the non-Govarnment  (e.g., enterprises)  and the Government  sectors.  In
this section I discuss the role played by the financial system in the allocation credit to these
sectors.  The Financial  Plan  allocated the available  credit by setting the credit targets, which
corresponded  closely to the material targets set in the State Plan. Available  credit, which results
from the households  money holdings, was estimated  in the State Plan as a residual  after estimating
the expenditure  and the income  targets.  Credit was channelled  to the productive sectors thruugh
she  financial system and was allocated among  economic sectors and banks by using credit ceilings.
In addition, the authorities also used credit ceilings to allocate credit between working capital and
investment loans. The financial Plan's credit targets and credit ceilings  could only be modified by
the Council  of Ministers.
In this system, unlike the market oriented one, the authorities exerted direct control over
credit allocation.  Interest rates (the opportunity cost of credit) and banks' risk and return
assessment  played a marginal  role in credit allocation. The authorities controlled credit allocation
and the flow of credit to the economy through the system of credit targets and by limiting the
quantity of credit.  This system of credit allocation  and control prevailed  both before 1987, when
the NBB  carried out all of the lending, and after 1987, when thb new banks (SCBs  and CCBs)  were
created. After 1987, the NBB set credit ceilings by bank and each bank had credit celinfis  by
economic sector and by type of loan, e.g., working capital and investment loans.  In this system,
bankers' res  nsibility was limited to implementing  the Financial  Plan targets; they had no
discretionary  power.  There was no reward for "good" bankers  nor a penalty for "bad" bankers.
Perhaps  the only penalty was the rernoval of the bank manager.
The Socialist system of credit control and allocation  was not efficient.  Frequently  the
authorities had to overrule their own credit targets by authorizing  a greater credit expansion  than
that envisaged  in the Financial  Plan. Although it is not clear when the easing  of credit started, by-9-
the late 1  980s the authorities were unable  to enforce discipline (hard-budget  constraint) on
enterprises. Bv then the financial system hat! bec.ome  the supplier  of finance to sustain the loss-
making enterpri3es. The authorities encouraged  indiscipline (soft-budget constraint) by making
credit readily  available.
Table 3:  Barking System's  Expension  fn Net Domestic  Assets 1/
(Percentage  of GDP)
...  ..  . .... ^.  ................
1987  1988  1989  1990
. ..  ..  .......  . . . . . . . . . .
NE. DOMESTIC  ASSETS  C1+2)  12.5  11.5  11.5  66.9
1.  Net Dowstic  Credit (ua+b)  14.0  12.6  12.6  32.?
a.  Net Ctaims  on General  Govt.  3.5  5.8  5.8  21.2
Not State Budget  -0.5  1.3  1.3  18.2
In  Leva  -0.8  1.4  1.4  11.5
In  Convertible Currencies  0.3  -0.0  -0.0  6.7
Extra-Budgetary  Funds,  Net  4.0  4.5  4.5  2.9
FCIf  3.2  4.5  4.5  1.1
othur  0.8  -0.0  -0.0  1.9
b. Claims  on Won-Goverrment  10.5  6.7  6.7  11.6
Claims on Non-Financial  PSE  9.4  5.6  5.6  6.7
In  Leva  8.2  4.8  4.8  -2.8
In  Convertible  Currencies  1.2  0.8  0.8  9.5
Claims on Private  Sector  1.1  1.1  1.1  4.9
lK%usinq  Construction  0.9  0.8  0.8  2.6
Other  0.3  0.3  0.3  2.3
2.  Net Other Assets  -1.5  -1.1  -1.1  34.2
a.  Capital Accounts  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -4.0
b.  Valuation Adjustment  2/  0.0  0.0  0.0  39.0
c.  Net Others  -0.4  0.2  0.2  -0.9
MM:
Cash  Public Sector Deficit  (PSD)  3/  5.1  5.6  1.4  9.2
Domestically-Financed  PSD  3.8  6.3  2.7  8.1
...........  ......................  ......................
Source:  National Bmk of Bulgaria, Monetary  Survey.
Notes: (C)  This is  the IMF-corrected  Monetary  Survey.  Corrections consist of:
-ttfng  Mlunicipalities'  demand  deposits from Net Claims  on General  Goverrwnent
ard  .lassifying  SCIF  as part of Net Claims  on General  Goverrment.  Estimates
mesure the increase in end-of period (December)  stocks. Estimates for  1990  ere
preliminary.  (2)  Is  the foreign exchange  risk  ess wd by banks  (valuation effects  and
measures  the  effect  on banks, balance sheet of  devaluations  in  the  domestic currency.
on average banks have more liabilities  than  assets denominated in  foreign
currency.  (3)  Includes  only  the  paid  interest  on foreign  debt.  The 1990 is  a
preliminary estimate.
Available estimates on the financial system's credit expansion (See  estimates in Table 3.)
indicate that the major borrowers from the financial system, with the exceptior of 1990, were the
non-financial  public sector enterprises  (PSEs). In 1987-89, on average,  total net domestic credit
increased  by 12.7 percent of GDP,  of which credit to PSEs  accounted for 7.6 percent  of GDP;  that
is, PSEs  accounted  for 70 percent of total net domestic credit expansion. Although it is difficult to
obtain hard evidence, anecdotal information suggests that a large proportion  of the credit granted
to PSEs'  after 1987 was used to finance current losses. Moreover, to the extent that the
authorities made  credit available  to PSEs,  it signaled  to them that undiscipline  could continue and-10-
that rid loans could always be repaid  with  new ones.
Distribution of credit by type of enterprises,  type of loan and economic sector followed the
State Plan's material product targets closely (see  Table  4).5  Within the enterprise  sector most
credit was allocated to socialist enterprises  and little to cooperatives  and the household  sector.  On
average,  in 1987-89 the socialist enterprises  accounted for 80 percent of total credit provided  to
the enterprise  sector.  The most important tVpe of loans were working capital and investment  loans
accounting  for 50 and 40 percent of total credit, respec" ,ely.  Mortgages and  consumer  credit
(household  sector loans) were less  imporant  and  accounted for 10 percent of total.  Although this
credit distribution reflected the relative importance  of each sector in the economy, it also indicates
the Plan's priority in allocating credit to socialist enterprises.
Table  4:  Breakdown of  Enterprise  Credit  by  Type  of  Enterprise
(End-Period  Stocks,  in  Bitlion  Levs)
.........................  ........................................  .... 
1986  1987  1988  1989 Sept.  1990
1.  Total  Bank Credit  by  Type of  Enterprise  1/  34.9  37.3  39.8  41.7  43.8
(=A+B*C+D)
A.  Socialist  Enterprises  28.4  30.3  32.5  33.9  n.a.
Working  Capital  15.9  17.3  18.9  19.9  n.a.
Investment  12.5  13.0  13.5  14.0  n.a.
B.  Cooperatives  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.7  n.a.
Working  Capital  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0  n.a.
Investment  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  n.e.
C.  Non-Socialist  Entities  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  n.s.
D.  Households  3.8  4.2  4.6  5.1  n.a.
Mortgages  2.9  3.6  3.6  3.8  n.a.
Other  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  n.a.
Memorandwn  Items:
Investment  credit  from  SCIF 2/  -2  --  2.1  4.1  5.7
Energy  generation  - - 1.0  2.0  3.3
Metallurgy  and mining  --  --  0.3  0.6  0.8
Agricultural  construction  and  irrigation  --  *-  0.2  0.3  0.1
reavy machine  building  - --  0.1  0.3  0.3
Housing  industrial  construction  --  --  0.1  0.2  0.3
Other  4/  --  --  0.4  0.S  0.8
.................................................................................................
Source:  National  lank  of  Bulgaria.
Notes:  (1)  Differences  with  the  Monetary  Survey  are  explained  by  differences  in  data  sources
used.  (2)  State  Investment  Credit  Fund.
Loans  to enterprises  were mostly denominated  in Levs. The share of enterprises' credit
denominated  in foreign exchange  was about 2 percent in 1986 and only increased  to 10 percent in
5t  Differences  in the  estimates  of  this  table and Table  3,  resulted  from  the  different  sources  used for  "gir  compilation.
While  Table  3  provides  more  accurate  est6nates  of  the  volume  of  credit  extended  to  eaterprises,  Tablb  4  illustrates  its
distribution.November 1990 (see  Table 5).  This happened  even though banks also funded their lending  by
resorting to foreign exchange  deposits and foreign exchange  loans.  In fact, banks like the BFTB,
assumed  a substantial  risk by borrowing in foreign exchange  and lending to enterprises  in Levs.
These foreign exchange  loans accounted  for a large proportion of the country's foreign public
sector debt.  In 1990, PSEs  benefitted substantially because  they were forgiven from the effect of
a devaluation  (in the official exchange  rate) on the cost of serving these loans, i.e., the foreign
exchange  risk.  The magnitude  of this effect is evidenced in the large size of the item "Valuation
Adjustment" (see  Table 3) and in banks  foreign exchange  risk (see  Table 5).  Had  enterprises
assumed  the foreign exchange  risk, their credit stock would have increased  by 44 percent of GDP.
This would have had an immediate  effect on enterprises' cash-flow since their interest axpenses
also would have increased.
While in the early-1  980s enterprises  benefitted from ready  access  to credit, in the late-
1  980s they benefitted from the very negative interest rates (see  Table 6).  In the early-1  980s, as
explained,  enterprises  benefitted from a strong supply of credit.  This enabled  them to roll-over
their loans.  In late-1  980s, however, this situation changed. Enterprises  start benefitting from the
very negative real interest rates as a result of the increase  in the inflation rate.
Table  5:  Share of  Enterprises  Credits  Denominated  in  Foreign Currency
and Banks' Foreign Exchange  Risk
...  .....  . . ..  ,  . . ..  ,  . ..  . . ..  . . . ..  . . ._.  . . .
Nov.
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Share of  Enterprise  FEX  Loans  1.8X  2.5X  2.9X  4.0X  10.4X
in  Total  Enterprise  Loans 1/
Banks Foreign Exchange  Risk  2/  4.9  4.8  4.5  3.7  4.8
Of which:  BFTB  2/  6.8  6.5  6.3  i.1  8.5
.......  ............  _..........................................  ...................................  ................................................... 
Source: National  Bank of  Bulgaria.
Notes:  (1)  FEX  stands for  loreign  exchange. (2)  Banks Foreign exchange risk  is  defined  as the
ratio  of  total  foreign  exchange  deposits  to  total  enterprises  foreign  exchange loans,  that  is,
excluding  General Government*s  FEX-denaminated  loans. This  ratio  measures  the  effect  on banks
net  worth of  a nominal devaluation.  For  instance,  in  November  1990  a 1 percent  nominal
devaluation  would increase  the  average bank liabilities  in  5 percent more than their  assets,
thus a fall  in  banks net  worth (a  loss)  equivalent  to  5 percent  of  their  FEX-denominated
liabilities.
Interest rates in Bulgaria  were fixed in nominal terms for a long period and the authorities
only started adjusting them in 1988.  While in 1986-88 the real interest rates on credits hovered
Al Until 1991,  howev6r, banks' accounts understated  the true magnitude of  foreign exchange transactions.  By law
banks had to convert these transactions  Into lev at the official exchange  rate, even though some of  the foreign exchange
transactions, in  practice, were  exchanged at  the  commercial exchange rate.  The  difference, even  though a  mere
bookkeeping,  were either covered by subsidies  from the budget or, transferred  to the budget as revenue  from 'coefficient
differences.'  In recent  years, the latter was the common  practice.-12-
between 1 percent and to 2.6 percent, they turned very negative  in 1989.  This was despite  the
authorities adjusted  the nominal BIR  from 4 percent to 4.5 percent in June 1988.  In 1989, taal
interest rates on working capital and investment loans hovered  between -4.2 percent and -5.7
percent and in 1990 between -35.5 percent and -36.4 percent. Therefore,  the negative real
interest rates became  an instrument for transferring low-cost resources  to enterprises. The -35
percent annual real interest rate in 1990 implied that a third of the real  outstanding enterprises
stock of debt was forgiven in this year.
Table  6:  Real  Interest  Rates  on  Bank Credit  1/
(End  of Period,  in  Percent  per  Annumn)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Basic  interest  rate  (BIR)  2/  1.3  1.3  2.3  -5.0  -36.3
Credits  to socialist  sector
Investment  credit  1.8  1.0  1.6  -5.7  -36.4
Working  capital  2.1  2.1  2.6  -4.2  -35.5
Credits  to  households
Goods  and  services  0.8  0.&  1.3  -5.9  -36.9
Housing  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -7.3  -37.8
Credits  for  financing  state
budget  deficit  3/
Short-term:  State  Budget  - --  -1.2  -8.2  -38.4
Locat  Goverrnments  --  --  -1.7  -8.6  -38.7
Long  term
From NBB: Old  loans  - -0.2  0.3  -6.8  -37.5
New loans  in  1989  --  --  --  -5.9  -36.9
From BFTS 4/  --  0.2  0.3  -6.8  -37.5
From SSB  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -7.3  -37.8
MEMO:
Investment  credit  from  SICF 5/  -2.6  -2.6  -2.2  -9.1  -39.0
opportunity  Cost  of  Domestic  Credit  6/  -1.5  44.1  39.5  92.4  33.0
..........  ..............................  .................................................................
Source:  National  Bank  of Bulgaria  and IMF.
(1)  Real interest  rates  were  estimated  using  the formula:  Ci-p)/C1+p),  i is  the
nominal  interest  rate  and  p is  the inflation  rate.  (2)  NBB's  Loans  to other  financial
Institutions.  BIR  nominal  interest  rate  was increased  from  4.0 percent  in  June  1988
to 4.5  percent  in  September  1988.  (3)  UntiL  June  1988  up to one  month,  since  July
1988  up to three  months.  (4)  Is an  estimate  of the  real interest  rate  in  Levs  of  DM
deposit  in  the international  market.  (5)  This is the  maximum  interest  rate.  SCIF
loans  to agriculture  were  interest  free. (6) Is  an estimate  of the  real  prime
lending  rate  in levs  for  borrowing  in  Deutsche  Marks  in  the  international  market.  It
is  defined  as:  (i*+E-p)/(1+p),  i* is  the  international  nominal  prime  lending  rate  on
a  DM loan,  E is  the  devaluation  in  the  parallel,  exchange  rate  1ev/ON and p  is  the
inflation  rate  (consumer  price  index). All variables  are end-period  estimates.
However, until 1991 the real interest rate failed to measure  accurately the true opportunity
cost of credit. In Bulgaria,  prices  of goods, which are used to compute  the real interest rates, were
subject to controls.  Therefore,  to the extent that ratianing  of goods prevailed  at the controlled
prices, these prices  understate the true price level and thus the real interest rate also understates
the true opportunity cost of credit.  To correct this problem, the opportunity cost of domestic credit
(see  Table  6) has been estimated by calculating what would have been  the cost in levs of a loan-13-
obtained  from a German  bank in DM.  This estimate assumes  that Levs  were exchanged  at the
parallel  market exchange  rate.  This rate indicates  an increase  in the real opportunitv#  cost of
domestic credit from -1.5 p0rcent  in 1986 to 92 percent in 1989, which then fell to 3:  percent in
1990. Therefore, this indicates  that in fact the real interest computed  using the official price index
understates  the true gain enterprises  obtained  from having  access  to low-cost credit from the
domestic financial system. The authorities, bv providing  enterprises  access  to low-cost credit,
encouraged  the financial indiscipline  in the enterprise  sector: the greater the losses  the more low-
cost (subsidized)  credit the enterprise received.
Enterprises  had difficulties paying their loans, even though they were exempted  from the
foreign exchange  risk and real interest on loans were negative starting in 1989.  Moreover,  the
priority sub-sectors  were the ones with greatest problems. These  sectors included mineral
extraction, metallurgy, energy generation  and agriculture. An indication of this difficultv  was the 2-
year general  moratorium  granted by the Government  in 1987.  This moratorium enabled  enterprises
to renegotiate  their payment  conditions with banks.  Some  enterprises  renegotiated  their loans and
became  creditworthy, while others defaulted on their loans  and limited their access  to credit from
the financial system.  Because  defaulting enterprises  were concentrated  in the priority sectors, the
Government  started channelling  credit to these sectors a. preferential conditions through an extra-
budgetary  fund, SCIF  (Specialized  Credit Investment Fund). (See  Taole 4 for a breakdown of the
credits granted by the SCIF  and  Table 6 for an estimate of real  interest rates.) .Jn  addition, in March
1990, the Government  wrote off about 2.2 billion lev of agricultural  and agro-industry cooperative
loans (see  Table 5).
Concerning  the credit allocated to the Government  sector, it accounted for a significant
portion of the credit expansion (see  Table  3).  This credit was used both for lending to enterprises
through the SCIF  and to finance the deficit.  In 1987-89, on average,  financial system's expansion
in net credit to the General  Government  was 4 percent of GDP  per annum, which represented  31
percent of total financial system's net credit expansion. However, most of this credit was used to
fund the SCIF. On average,  in 1987-89 credit extended  to the SCIF  accounted for 3.6 percent of
GDP per annum. In addition, the Government  also used the credit to finance its own deficit which
was substantial  in 1988 and 1990.
Interest rates on Government  loans were even lower than those applicable  to enterprise
credit (see  Table 6), that is, they had access  to preferential rates.  Real  interest on Government
loans  started to be negative in 1988.  In 1988-90, real interest rates on Government  loans were
between -1.2 percent and -38.7.-14-
Starting in 1989, the authorities took measures  to control credit expansion. In 1989, the
banking  reform authorized  the NBB  to impose  credit ceilings on bank credit expansion to enterprises
and  the Government  took fiscal measures  to reduce  the public sector deficit.'  However, the credit
ceilings  were not met (credit ceiling  for working capital was exceeded by 3 percent and that for
investment  credit in 1 percent), and  the deficit increased  substantially.
In 1990, most of the credit expansion  was accounted for by the Government  sector as a
result of the public sector deficit.  The non-Government  sector credit expansion,  which also was
substantial,  was accounted  for by the enterprises  foreign exchange  losses resulting  from the May
1990 devaluation  and by the increase  in credit to the private sector.  Although credit denominated
in levs to the PSEs  showed a contraction (see  Table 3), this was largely explained  by the debt
write-off to the agricultural sector.
However, the increase  in the enterprises'  credit stock as a result of the devaluation  had a
small effect on enterprises  cash-flow because,  as explained before, most of the foreign exchange
risk was assumed  by banks.  But this effect was felt in banks' balance  sheets.  Banks  would have
to finance their cash-flow mis-match. This arises  from the difference between low return on banks
assets (denominated  in Levs) and  the high return on their liabilities (an important portion
denominated  in foreign exchange). To avoid  this problem,  that would have affected banks  finances
or the fiscal deficir or both, the authorities in March 1990 declared  a moratorium  on foreign
exchange  loans.
B.3.2  The Monetary Overhana  and Monetary Policv
A key aspect of Bulgaria's  financial system, has been the strong involuntary demand  for
money, as revealed  by a high M2 to GDP  ratio.  It was this very high involuntary demand  for
money that enabled  the authorities to expand the supply of credit.3 In 1987-90, on average,
demand for M2--measured  as the increase  in M2 as ratio of GDP--increased  by 10 percent per
annum, of which about 7 percent was accounted  for by MI.  In 1987-89, this resulted in an
average  M2 to GDP ratio of about 100 percent of GDP  and in an Ml  to GDP  ratio of about 45
percent (see  Table 7).
7/  These ceilings called for a freeze in nominal  investment credit expansion and for a 5 percent reduction in nominal
working capital  credit expansion.
8/  Starting in 1987, the authorities  also resorted  to foreign  borrowing to finance the domestic credit expansion.-15-
In terms of maturity (see  Table 7), in 1987-89 on average  about 12 percent of GDP
consisted of currency, 33 percent of demand  deposits and the remaining  55 percent of GDP
consisted oS  savings  and time deposits.  Most demand  deposits are held by public sector
enterprises--about  30 percent of GDP--while  most of the savings  and time deposits are held by
households. In fact, the single most important type of deposit is savings deposits held by the
household  sector (chiefly accounted for by the SSB's deposits); these accounted for more than 46
percent of GDP. It is also important that most of M2 is denominated  in Levs.  Foreign  currency-
denominated  deposits (in convertible  and non-convertible  currencies)  accounted  for about 10
percent of GDP. The authorities allowed deposits denominated  in US dollars, in Swiss Francs  or
Deutsche  Marks, only in January 1990.
Tabte  7:  Composition  of  Broad  Money 1/
(Percentage  of GDP)
. ...  .....  ..  . ...  ..  ....  ....  ............
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
BROAD  MOHEY,  M2 (=1+2+3)  2/  97.4  96.6  101.4  101.1  83.3
1.  Money,  Ml  41.0  44.5  48.1  50.1  45.8
Currency  Outside  Banks  10.0  11.0  12.3  14.0  12.4
Demand  Deposits  31.0  33.6  35.8  36.1  33.4
In  Leva  28.6  31.1  32.9  32.5  29.6
in  Hon-Convertible  Currencies  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.1  0.8
In  Convertible  Currencies  1.7  1.7  1.9  2.4  3.0
2.  Quasi-Money  55.4  51.0  52.4  50.1  35.9
Time Deposits  3.7  1.3  1.5  2.3  6.4
Savings  Deposits  46.7  45.1  46.3  43.1  29.1
Car  Deposits  3.7  3.7  3.9  3.8  --
Other  Deposits  1.4  0.9  0.5  0.7  --
Foreign  Currency  Deposits  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4
3. Import  and  Restricted  Deposits  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.6
In  Non-Convertibte  Currencies  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
In  ConvertibLe  Currencies  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.7  i3
..........  .....................  ..  .........  ...............  ......  ....  . .......  ----
Source:  National  Bank  of Bulgaria,  Monetary  Survey.
Notes:  (1)  This  is the  IMF-corrected  Monetary  Survey. Corrections  consist  of: removing
Municipalities  deposits  from  the  definition  of demand  deposits;  and re-classifying
interest-remunerated  savings  SSB  deposits  as Quasi-Money  (rather  than  as demand
deposits).  (2)  To correct  for  price  differences  arising  from  coaputing  a  ratio  of an
end-period  stock  and  a GDP flow  at average  prices,  stocks  were  converted  at
average-1989  prices  using  the  end-period  consumer  price  index  and  coqmuting  its  ratio  to  9
real  GDP  with  base  average-1989. Real  GDP was  estimated  using  GDP implicit  price
deflator.
A combination of factors make possible  this high involuntary demand  for money, thus
leading  to a "monetary overhang" problem. The two most important factors were the
disequilibrium  in the goods market and the small number  of financial assets offered by the financial
system. The diaquilibrium  in the goods market resulted from the authorities' policy of
guaranteeing  a stable income to the income  earners  by controlting prices of goods, the nominal
exchange  rate, the nominal  interest rate and the nominal  wage.  As was explained before, the-16-
authorities did not relV  on relative prices  for allocating  resources;  they instead used the State Plan's
material product targets to allocate resources. However, the Plan's  targets usually resulted in the
households  having to save more than thev would have wanted because  aggregate  demand  for
goods exceeded  aggregate  supply. The small number  of assets compelled  households  to invest
their savings in these assets. Thev were the oniV ones available  and they offered the highest real
retum, which, in turn, resulted from the authorities price control policy.
Bulgaria's high involuntary household  saving rate is evidenced  when compared  to that of
other markEt countries (see  Table 8).  In 1985-90, on average,  Bulgarian  households'  saved about
10 percent of their disposable  income, of which thev invested more than two thirds in financial
assets.  Although international comparisons  of household  saving rates are risky because  of the
particular conditions of the Bulgarian  economy,  they provide an idea of the relative size if compared
to high and low saving countries. While Bulgaria's  household  saving rates are similar to those
experienced  bV high savers,  such as Japan and Germany  in the late-1  980s, thev are very high
when compared  to the low saving rates of US households. 9
Table 8:  Household  Savings Patio  1/
(In  Percent)
. __...........  ._.  .......  ..............  .....  ......  ..  ......
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
.....  ...  ...........  ..  ....  ........  ....  ..  ....
Bulgaria:  9.4  8.2  9.2  11.1  9.9  16.1
in  Housing Assets  3.2  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.3  2.1
in Financial  Assets  6.2  5.7  6.6  8.5  7.5  14.0
MEMO:
Japan  16.0  16.4  15.1  14.8  15.3  n.a.
U.S.  4.5  4.3  3.3  4.3  5.6  n.a.
Germany  11.4  12.2  12.3  12.6  12.2  n.a.
........  ...............  _*_...............  .................................  ......  ...........  .......  ....  ..............................  .
Source: Data provided  by Bulgarian  authorities;  and OECD  (1M90).
Note:  (1)  Households  savings as  ratio  of  disposable  income.
Interest rates helped  to channel  the involuntary savings  into the financial sVstem  by offering
attractive,yields relative to alternative  savings outlets until 1986.  Until 1986, interest rates on
domestic financial assets were attractive compared  to what a saver could obtain abroad  in a
deposit denominated  in foreign exchange.  Also until 1988, real interest rates on financial assets
were only slightiv negative and did not discourage  savers  from depositing their savings  in the
91  The  involuntary high households  savings rates would be more evident if  Bulgaria's househoids  saving retes are
adjusted  for life-cycle effects, such as  are the provision for re  tirement and housing.  In Bulgaria.  unlike market economies,
the provisions  for retirement  and  housing  are made  by the State and,  thus households  do not need  to save  for theba
motives.-17-
financial system (see  Table  9).10 In 1986, compared  to what could be obtained  in a foreign
currency  denominated-deposit  (see  Memo Item in Table 9). domestic interest rates offered a
relatively high return on assets. By international  standards, interest rates started to be
uncompetitive in 1987-88, when the parallel  market exchange rate started to devalue."  Relative
to official inflation, however, interest rates only started to become very unattractive after 1988.
Until 1988 depositors could find deposits which offered positive real interest rates, such as was
the case of time deposits with banks. In 1989, the real interest rates on the mnst important
deposits--savings  deposits with SSB  and demand deposits with banks--became  very negative.
Table 9:  Real Interest  Rates on Bank  Deposits  1/
(End of  Period,  in  Percent per Annum)
...  ...  . ...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
......................  ....................................  ..........
Deposits with  SSB
Demand  deposits  -1.7  -1.7  -1.2  -8.2  -38.4
Savings  Deposits
GeneraL  -1.7  -1.7  -1.2  -8.2  -38.4
Childrens'  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -7.3  -37.8
Housing deposits  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -7.3  -37.8
Enterprises  deposits  with  banks 2/
Demand  Deposits 3/  -1.7  -1.7  -1.2  -8.2  -38.4
Time Deposits
1-6 months  -1.4  -1.4  n.s.  n.a.  n.a.
3 Months  n.e.  n.a.  0.3  -6.8  -37.5
over  3 months  n.s.  n.a.  1.3  -5.9  -36.9
Minimum  -1.2  -1.2  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Maximum  4.7  4.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Goverrnent deposits
State  budget  --  *-  -1.2  -8.2  -38.4
Local goverrewnts  --  --  -1.7  -8.6  -38.7
interbank  deposits  with  NBB
Demand  Deposits  -0.7  -0.7  -0.2  -7.3  -37.8
Three Months' deposits  n.a.  n.a.  0.5  -6.6  -37.3
Deposits over  three  n.a.  n.a.  1.5  -5.7  -36.7
months
MEM0:
Reel opportunity  Cost of  Holding  -6.5  39.0  34.6  88.3  31.9
Lev-Denominated  Deposits 4/
Source: National  Bank of  Bulgaria  and IMF.
Notes:  (1)  In  January 1990 authorities  aLlowel  accounts in  USS  and DM.  These
earn 5 3/4  percent  and 5 5/8  percent,  respettively,  for  demand  deposits  and
6 1/4  percent  and 6 1/8  percent,  respectively,  for  time deposits  of  at  least  1
year.  (2)  The  IBB, OFTS, and conmnercial  banks.  (3)  Until  June 1988 up to  one
month, since  July  1988 up to  three  months. (4)  Is  an estimate  of  the  real  interest
rate  in  Levs of  ON  deposit  in  the  international  market.  It  is  defined  as:
(l**E-p)/(l+p),  i*  is  the  international  nominal deposit  interest  rate  on a  DM
deposit,  E is  the  devaluation  in  the  parallel  exchange  rate  Lev/DM  and p is  the
inflation  rate  (consLuer price  index).  All  variables  are  end-period  estimates
10/  This is consistent with international evidence on countries that experienced  hyperinfiation.  e.g., Latin American
countries. It indicates  that depositors  only withdraw their savings  from the financial system when the real interest rate falls
below a threshold and that this is between 0 and -10 percent.
11/ In relation  to the DM the Lev devalued  by: -8 percent  in 1986; 40 percent in 1987; 34 percent in 1988; 100 percent
in 1989;  and In 109 percent  in 1990.-18-
The importance  of the involuntary money holdings or "monetary overhang" problem is that
it poses  a threat to monetary and price stability.  If asset holders reduce  their cash  holdings to their
equilibrium  levels,  e.g., as a result of price liberalization,  the monetary overhang would immediately
leacd  to an excess supply of money and thus to inflationary pressures. Unlike other countries which
experience  inflation as a result of money creation (flow), in Bulgaria  inflationary pressures  arise
both from the excess  money holdings (stoCk  of money) and from money creation (flow).  In fact,
inflationary pressures  could result even in the presence  of a tight monetary policy.  The magnitude
of Bulgaria's monetary overhang  problem can be'seen  by comparing  Bulgaria's money to GDP ratio
with that of other developed  and developing  countries (see  Table '  Bulgaria's  ratio is above
those of countries with more developed  financial markets, such a& `  ,nany and the U.K.; above
developing  countries, such as Yugoslavia  and Turkey; and above countries that also have a
substantial  monetary overhang  problem, such as Algeria and Egypt.  In fact, Bulgaria's  money to
GDP  ratio is one the highest in the world.
Teble 10:  International  Conparison of  Money  to  GDP  Ratio
(Percentage of  GOP)
1984  1988
Ml  M2  Ml  M2
-------  ------  ---  ..  .....  ........
Developed:
Germany  16.1  54.4  19.6  61.6
U.K.  14.5  39.5  36.4  85.8
Spain  21.1  62.1  25.6  67.1
Portugal  24.6  104.5  29.9  105.2
Eastern European:
Butgarie  n.a.  n.a.  48.2  101.6
Yugoslavia  15.5  54.1  9.1  38.2
Other Developing:
Turkey  11.9  26.4  8.8  20.6
Egypt  31.5  65.6  22.6  59.8
Algeria  59.4  64.1  56.8  66.9
.....  .........  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  statistics;  and  World  Bank's Economic  Database.
Note: To correct for  price differences arising  from corputing a ratio  of an end-period
stock and  a GDP-flow  estimate at average  prices, stocks were  converted  to average-1980
prices using  end-period  Lrnsuner price  index and  computing  its  ratio  to real  GDP  with
base  average-1980.  In the case of Bulgaria average-1989  was  used  as a base  year.
The monetary overhang  problem poses  a real challenge  for the monetary authorities. This
can be illustrated by using the quantity theory of money.  Consider  such an equation as,
V  .PxY  (1)
V is the actual income velocity of money, P is the price level, Y the real  long-term income and  M is
the actual derrand for money.  Now consider  thiat equilibrium  demand  for money is M which-19-
corresponds  to an equilibrium  Income velocity of circulation VI, such that V <  VI.  Therefore,  the
authorities' challenge  is to reduce inflationary pressures  of the excess  money stock by stimulating
individuals  to (a) increase  their equilibrium  money holdings and reduce  the equilibrium  income
velocity of circulation; or lb) increase  the actual velocity of circulation until reaching  its
equilibrium.
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What follows is a list of the four most important measures  that could be used for this
purpose:
(i) a price increase. This would have the consequence  of wiping out both the excess  stock
of money and  the stock of real  credit by inducing a reduction in real monetary holdings.
This, in turn, would result in a increase  in actual velocity of money until converging  with
the desired one.
(ii) an increase  in the real rate of return on monetary holdings. This can be achieved by
increasing  the real rate of return on monetary assets  or reducing  the inflation rate or both.
Such increase  would induce savers  to increase  their demand  for money and for financial
assets (bank deposits)  at the given price and income levels, thus reducing  the equilibrium
income  velocity of money.  This measure,  however, assumes  that demand for money is
elastic to changes  in the real return on assets.
(iii) sale  of public sector property.  This would cause asset holders to shift their portfolio out
of monetary assets and into productive capital shares. Sale of public sector property could
be public sector enterprises,  but it could also include real estate property.  The reduction in
asset holders' money holdings would cause  an increase  in actual income velocity of money
until converging  with the equilibrium  income velocity of money.  In addition, the sale of
public sector property to the private sector could increase  the income velocity of money, if
it results in an increase  in real income.  Such an increase  in real income could result from a
greater productivity of capital attained by transferring public sector property to the private
sector.  However, for this to happen,  the sale of such property would have to be done very
rapidly.
(iv) conversion  or blocking of financial assets.  Money stock could be temporarily or
II/  This, however, presupposes  that tle  authorities  would be able to measure  the extent of monetary  overhang. For  a
very interesting  method for estimating  the extent of monetary  overhang  see, Feitenstain,  Lebow and van Wijnbergen  (I9871.
Thern.  is however an ongoing debate  on the accuracy of the method to estimate  the extent the morotory overhang.-20-
permanently  frozen by forcing asset holders to convert their bank deposits into a different
instrument with a different maturity and payment profile--e.g., Government  bonds--or,  by
blocking  their withdrawal of such deposits. The conversion  would be a temporary freeze,
while the blocking could be a permanent  one.  These  measures  would have the
consequence  of reducing  the stock of money and thus increasinc  actual income velocity of
money until converging with the equilibrium  level.
Table  11:  Monetary  Poticy  Indicators
(Percentage  of GDP)
.........  .................  ...  ....  .......  ..........  .........
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
.............  ...........................  ..................................
Stock  of  Base  Money  C-1+2)  1/  505.5  313.1  245.2  171.0  59.3
1.  Currency  in  Circulation  14.1  14.1  15.8  16.7  13.1
2.  Deposit  Money  Bank's  Deposits  53.0  50.2  50.0  43.8  34.2
3.  Other  Deposit  Money  Bank's  Deposits  2/ 438.4  248.8  179.4  108.5  11.9
Expansion  in  Base  Money with  Public  (a+b)3/  -151.5  -53.4  -52.8  -81.5
a. Currency  in  Circulation  2.7  4.5  3.4  6.1
b. Deposit  Money  Bank's  Deposits  1.1  2.4  2.6  2.2
Total  Revenues  (W1+2)  4/  1.2  3.1  2.1  4.9
1. Seignorage  5/  1.0  3.1  -2.7  -23.2
2. Inflation-Tax  6/  0.2  -0.1  4.8  28.0
MEMO:  (In  Percent)
Broad Monetary  Multiplier  7/  19.3  30.9  41.4  59.1  134.8
IncOme Velocity  of  M2 8/  102.7  103.5  98.6  98.9  125.2
-ncome  Velocity  of MI 9/  243.9  224.5  207.9  199.8  240.5
End-Period  Average  Inflation  Rate  10/  2.7  2.2  10.0  64.0
Average  Annuat  Inflation  Rate  11/  0.1  2.2  4.4  23.9
..............  .............................  ............  ..........................  ...........  ................  ..................  .....
Source:  National  Bank  of Bulgaria,  Monetary  Survey.
Notes:  (1)  Corrected  for  price  differences  as explained  in  note  (1) in  Table  7.  (2)
Consists  of  DMBs'  deposits  held  for  the  purpose  of  the  clearing  system.  (3)  Estimated
as the increase  In  end-period  stocks.  (4)  Estimates  the  NBB's  revenue  from  seignorage  ard
inflation-tax  levied  on public  money  holdings. Excludes  Banks,  deposits  with  the  NBB
for  the  clearing  system. It is  calculated  using  the  equation:  (Dt-Dt-1-i*Dt-1)/GDPt;  D
is the  stock  of NBSs'  deposits  (interest-  and noninterest-bearing),  i is  the  nominal
interest  rate  paid  and  GDP is  the  nominal  GDP. (5)  Estimated  using  the  equation:
(dt-dt-1)/gdp;  d and  gdp are,  respectively,  the  stock  of NBB's  deposits  and  GDP  at
constant  prices. (6)  Obtained  as a  difference  between  Total  Revenues  and  Seignorage.
Includes  the inflation-tax  and price  differential  resulting  from  using  end-period
CPI for  estimating  the  stocks  at average-1989  prices  and the  average  GDP
price  deflator  for  calculating  real  GDP.  See  Annex  1 in  Thorne  (1991).  (7)  Is the  ratio
of M2 to  Base  Money.  (8) Is  the ratio  of real  GDP to real  M2. (9)  Is the  ratio  of real
GDP to real 11.  (10)  Estimated  using  the  end-period  Consumer  Price  Index.  (11)
Estimated  using  the  GDP  price  deflator  index.
Success  in dealing  with the monetary overhang lies in the authorities' ability to limit the
effect of the excess  money stock on inflation.  This can be done by reducing  the excess  money
stock using the measures  mentioned  before, e.g., a monetary reform. But it is unlikely that price
increase  would be avoided because  they are necessary  to correct relative price distortions.  The
1  940s' international experience  with monetary overhang  problems  indicates  that countries which-21-
opted for a monetary reform also  experienced  high inflation rates.' 3 That experience  also
indicates  that inflation resulted because  the authorities let the excess  money stock feed into prices
by failing to adopt anti-inflationary policies.  In fact, this experience  illustrated how quickly the
monetary overhang problem could result in a hyperinflation.  Studies  on hyperinflation experience
shows that it develops quickly in economies  with features similar to those prevailing in Bulgaria:  a
monetary overhang problem, large fiscal deficits, indexation of nominal  wages to past price levels,
and underdeveloped  financial markets.
A:though until 1991, when the Stabilization  Program  was undertaken,  the authorities lacked
a clear strategy of how to deal with the monetary overhang  problem, there were some important
monetary  policy developments  that happened  in the late 1980s (see  Table 11).  First, the
authorities took measures  to reduce  the inflationary pressures. In late-1  980s, they reduced  the
large  inherited monetary base by improving  the clearing  system; and in end-1  990 they introduced  a
5 percent reserve  requirement  on bank deposits. These measures  reduced  somewhat the
inflationary pressures  by reducing  the level of outstanding bank deposits (outstanding  bank
balances)  and by reducing the money multiplier.
Second  and in contrast, the authorities increased  the inflationary pressures  by continuing
their accomodative  monetary policy.  The authorities continued to use the expansion in  money
base as a source of revenue. For instance, on average  in 1987-89, NBB  expanded  the monetary
base with the public (excluding  banks deposits with the clearing system) by more than 3 percent of
GDP  and by 6 percent in 1990.  Most of these resources  were used to finance the General
Government  deficit.
The net effect of these two measures  resulted,  however, in an increase  in the inflationary
pressures.  This was indicated by the money multiplier and the income veincity of money estimates
(see  Table 11).  While both of these indicators improved  in 1986-89 when the authorities reduced
the excess  base money, in 1989-90 they began  to deteriorate  as the inflationary pressures
emerged. In 1987-89 the income velocity of MI  feil by about 20 percent, while in 1989-90 it
increased  by more than 20 percent. Also, as inflationary pressures  grew, NBB's non-inflationary
sources of revenue from money creation started diminishing and more revenue  was obtained from
inflationary sources.  Seignorage  fell from 3 percent of GDP  in 1988 to -23 percent in 1990, and
inflation tax increased  from -0.1 percent in 1988 to 28 percent in 1990.
jU/  See  Dornbusch  and  Wolf  O 990); and  Dornbusch,  Sturzonegger  and  Wolf (1990).-22-
These inflationary pressures,  in turn, affected the financial sVstem's  ability to attract
savings. The increase  in the rate of inflation from 2 percent in 1988, to 10 percent in 1989 and to
64 percent in 1990 undermined  the ability of the financial system to attract the excess  savings  in
the economy. The acceleration  of the inflation rate made real interest rates on lev-denominated
assets highly negative and reduced  demand  for financial assets. In 1989 real interest rates on
savings  deposits with the SSB  fell to -8 percent and In 1990 to -38  percent (see Table 9), which, in
turn, caused  demand  for M2 to drop from 100 petcent of GDP  in 1989 to 80 percent in 1990.
8.3.3  Non-Performing  Assets and their Effects
The true extent of non-performing  assets in bank portfolios is uncertain, although  they are
believed to be sizeable  relative to total loans. There are two reasons  that make quantification
difficult.  The first is the relative orice distortion.  The authorities would be able to quantify
nonperforming  bank loans only when they know the effect of the change in relative prices on
enterprises' financial situation.  Such a relative price change would result from introducing market
forces and lifting price controls.  (It is possible  that enterprises  whose loans appeared  to be
peri  nino became  nonperforming  when relative prices  changed  and vice-versa.) Second  is the
deficiency in bank and enterprise  accounting  plans.  Bank and enterprise balanc&  sheets  audited by
international auditors are unavailable. Also, as explained before, the differences between the
existing accounting  plans and the western ones lead to loan classification problams. For instance,
banks are not compelled  to classify their loans according  to performance,  to make provisions  on
non-performing  loans or to adjust their capital according  to risk.
The importance of estimating the size of banks' non-performing  assets is that it would
enable the authorities to quantify the cost of restructuring the financial system. This would have
an important effect on the design of a strategy for reforming and privatizing the financial system.
In particular, it is important to know: {i) how much banks  current losses  are, i.e., what their cash-
flow  shortfall is; and (ii) what proportion of total assets are non-performing,  or equally, what is the
value of their net worth adjusted  for nonperforming  assets. The first question indicates  the current
fiscal cost  to the Government  of keeping  these banks  operating and the second indicates  the fiscal
cost (in net present  value) of a bank clean-up. (The fiscal cost of the clean-up,  however, will vary
depending  on the scheme  adopted  and on the number  of years the cost is spread over.)
There bre two sources of non-performing  assets, both of which resulted from banks' loans
granted to public sector enterprises. The first source is the enterprise loans  transferred by the NBB
to the commercial  banks (SCBs  and the CCBs). These  are loans denominated  in Levs. The second-23-
source is the foreign exchange  risk assumed  by banks (i.e., BFTB's  forsign exchange  losses)  when
they lent to enterprises.  As explained  before, BFTB  granted lev-denominated  loans  to enterptlses
and financed  these loans by borrowing in convertible  currencies. Although some more non-
perf2rming  loans could have resulted from SCB  lending after 1987 and CCB  lending in 1990, they
are believed  to be small compared  to the total.  Moreover, since the Government  (through the
Financing  Plan)  compelled  banks to grant these lo.ns to enterprises,  they are a public sector
liability.
Although and for the reasons  explained  it is difficult to provide an accurate estimatA  of the
lev-denominated  non-performing  loans, anecdotal  informationi  suggests  that a crude estimate can
be made bv assuming  that these loans  wbre equivalent  to the deposits transferred by NBB  to SCBs
and CCBs  when they were established  (see  Table 12).14  In fact, since 1987 NBB  has been  unab!e
to recover these deposits from commercial  banks. This became particularly evident in early-1  991
when the interbank  market was established  and NBB  had to give a special  treatment to these
deposits.' 6 This estimate of nonperforming  loans assumes  that 54 percent of the enterprises
loans  transferred  by NBB  to SCBs  and CCBs  became nonperforming. In terms of their distribution
between SCBs  and CCBs, about two-thirds are accounted  for by SCBs  and one-third by CCBs.
These represent  two-thirds of total SCBs  extended  loans  and two-fifths of CCBs.
The effect of these nonperforming  loans on individual banks' balance  sheets is limited
because  NBB's deposits are equivalent to the amount of nonperforming  loans and their distribution
among banks  is similar to that of nonperforming  loans.  This is because  NBB  established  SCBs  and
CCBs  by transferring the same  amount of loans and deposits. But nonperforming  loans have an
important effect on NBB's net worth and cash-flow.  This is because  NBB  funded SCB  and CCB
deposits by borrowing from the SSB (through higher reserve  requirements). While NBB  has to pay
interest on SSB  loans, it might not receive payment  on the interest on SCBs  and CCBs  deposits.
This therefore, results in a cen,ral bank quasi-fiscal  deficit.  In fact, the worrisome effect is that it
could make monetary policy endogenous  because  NBB  can only finance this cash-flow deficit
14/  This estimate  is close to the Government's  estimnate,  calculated  by NBB's Supervision  Department  using commercial
banks' balance  sheets.  However, this estimate, as ours, is subject to the problems  mentioned in the text because  it  was
done before  the introduction  of new  banking  regulation  and supervision.
15/  In addition, it  could be argued  that commercial  banks would refrain from paying  back these deposits because  they
are guaranteeing  the nonperforming  loans granted by  the NBB.  Moreover, the implicit NBB  guarantee  on these deposits
posses a moral hazard  problem.  Because  banks are owned by state-owned  enterprises,  enterprise managers  would trV  to
maximize  their benefit from the guarsftee by forcing an enterprise  loan write-off of the same  amount as NBB  deposits.-24-
through monetary expansion. 1I  This could happen  if enterprises  fail to service their debts with
SCBs  and CCBs  and banks  decide to finance this short-fall by running arrears  on NBB  deposits.
Therefore, NBB  will have to finance  the interest shortfall by expanding  reserve money.
Table 12:  Estimates  of  sank Non-Performing Loans in  End-1990
.......  ............  . ......  . b....
Totel  Specialtized  Common
Caswmercial  Comuercial  Conmercial
Banks 1/  Banks  Banks
....................................
In  billion  Levs  21.3  13.3  8.0
As Share of  GOP  34.4X  21.4X  12.9X
As Share of  Banks' Extended  53.9X  64.62  42.3X
...................................  ........................................................  .. ....  ..... 
Source: National  Bank of  Bulgaria,  Monetary Survey
Notes: see  text  for  assumptions  used.
The second source of nonperforming  assets is bank assumed  foreign exchange  risk (BFTB's
foreign exchange  losses). Bank foreign exchange  risk is defined as the sum of total net foreign
exchange  liabilities and total foreign exchange  deposits less enterprises'  foreign exchange
credits."'  Defined  in this way, bank foreign exchange  risk indicates  the cost to banks  of having
assumed  the enterprises'  foreign exchange  risk.  Estimates  indicate that most of this risk is
accounted  for by BFTB  and thus, its main effect has been  on BFTB's  net worth and cash-flow.  In
general,  the greater the foreign exchange  risk, the lower the net worth and the greater the cash-
flow  shortfall.  Foreign  exchange  risk was equivalent  to about 8 percent of GDP in 1986 and
increased  to 39 percent in 1990 (see  Table 13); and measured  as the ratio of total BFTB  assets, it
was 23 percent in 1986 and increased  to 54 percent in 1990.
Table  13:  Estimate of  Banks' Assumed  Foreigin Exchange  Risk
(Percentage of  GDP)
........  ...  . .......
1986  1990
........................
Total  Banks  8.0  38.9
Of  ihich:  BFTB  8.0  38.5
.........................  .................................................................  ....
Source: National  Bank  of  Bulgaria,  Monetary Survey.
Notes: Ratios  to  GDP  have been corrected  as  explained
in  Table 7.  The 1990 estimate  is  for  November.  See text
for  the  definition  of  foreign  exchange  risk.
The recent inflation rate hike starting in 1989 and the devaluation  of the lev against
international currencies  in 1990, however, has introduced  additional effects on lev-denominated
nonperforming  assets and  foreign exchange  risk.  The fall in real interest rates as a result of the
11/ This is  because  NBB has no other sources  to  finance its carh-flow deficit.  NBB cannot increase further reserve
requirements  on SSB  (it is committed  to reduce  them) and foreign finance  is limited.
1.I  Net foreign  exchange liabilities are the  difference of  foreign excharge liabilities ond  foreign exchange assets,
including  General  Govert  mont foreign  exchange  credits as part of the foreign exchange  assets.-25-
increase  in the inflation rate has reduced  the _rWj  value of commercial  banks  lev-denominated
nonperforming  assets NBB  deposits and SSB  reserve  requirements,  thus reducing  the effect of
these assets on NBB  cash-flow.  In contrast, the devaluation  of the lev;  starting in '1990  has
increased  the real ley value of BFTB's  foreign exchange  risk and thus worsened  its profitability.
However, this effect on BFTB  (and  thus on the budget) has been unnoticed because'of the
Government  moratorium  on BFTB's  foreign creditors.  Its effect would depend  on the conclusion of
the foreign debt negotiations  that is currently taking place between the Bulgarian  authorities and
their foreign creditors.
C.  RECENT  GOVERNMENT'S  FINANCIAL  SECTOR  MEASURES
In February 1991, the Government  started adopting measures  aimed at correcting the financial
sector problems. These measures  were part of the Government's Economic  Reform Program  aimed
at transforming the economy into a market economy which has been supported both by an IMF
Stand-by and a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL}. Among the most important
measures  concerned  with the financial sector were: the monetary and credit measures  aimed at
correcting the credit allocation  and monetary overhang problems;  and the institutional measures
agreed  with the World Bank in July 1991.
C.  1  Monetarv and Credit Measures
In February 1991, the Govemment  started using monetary and credit measures  for reducing
the monetary overhang  and restraining  inflationary pressures. The authorities combined  these
monetary and credit measures  with a wage policy to restrain inflationary pressures. Wages  were
used as a nominal  anchor to control inflationary expectations during the first semester  of 1991.
The Govemment  negotiated maximum  nominal wage increases with trade unions and employers  for
the first and second quarters  of 1991.
Preliminary  results indicates  that these measures,  in concert with the other stabilization
measures,  were successful  in reducing  the monetary overhang and in controlling inflation.  The fall
in the ratio of M2 to GDP  from 83 percent in end-1990 to 47 percent in June 1991 indicated a
reduction in the extent of monetary overhang. 8  This also reduced  the rel  stock of credit
jJl  There  are  however  some  indications  that the fall in the M2 to GDP  ratio  overestimated  the true extent  of the
monetry overhang.  This  is pardty  explained  bV  the fact that the increase  in the price  level  was  greater  than  anticipated.
Although  this would  need  further  research,  one  can argue  that monetary  policy  was  extremely  restrictive. Nominal  credit
ceilings  (which were oalculatod  based  on an estimated  ecuilibrium  nominal  domand  for money)  resulted  in a nominal
expansion  in the supply  of money  below  whet would  be required  for the full adjustment  in relative  prices  to take  place. In-26-
denominated  in levs,  but increased  the banks  foreign  exchange  losses. The  ruiduction  in .he  lev-
denominated  credits  resulted  from the high inflation  rate  experienced  in the first quarter  of 1  991,
while  the increase  In the foreign  exchange  losses  resulted  from  the nominal  devaluation  of the lev.
The  inflation  rate  and  the e>.\hange  rate were  then  stabilized  by a combination  of monewary,  credit
and  exchange  rate  policies. The  rate of inflation  after reaching  111 percont  in February,  fell to 56
percent  in March,  to 3.5 percent  in April and  to 2.5 percent  in June 1991. In some  respects  these
measures  were  more  successful  than  other  stabilizations  which  used  the exchange  rate  as nominal
anchor,  such  as the Polish  program,  because  it stabilized  inflationary  expectations  without having
to fix the nominal  exchange  rate. This avoided  the problem  of cvervaluation  of the real  exchange
rate  and its effect  on export  growth.
The  authorities  reduced  the monetary  overhang  and  controlled  .nflationary  pressures  by lifting
price  controls  of most  goods  while  making  demand  for monetary  holdings  more  attractive. The
authorities  made  monetary  holdings  more  attractive  by:
(U  Increasing  Interest  rates. In February  1991, the Government  increased  the basic  interest
rate (BIR)--the  rate  at which  NBB  lends  to other  banks--from  4.5 percent  at end-I  990 to 15
percent  in January  1991, 45 percent  in February  and 52 percent  in June 1991. The
Government  intends  to continue  adjusting  the BIR  periodically  in line  with domestic  prices  and
the exchange  rate. It has  also  lifted  interest  rate  restrictions  on banks'  and  expects  them  to
fix their  interest  on deposits  and  loans  in response  to market  conditions  (excess  demand  for
funds)  and  to changes  in the BIR.'9 Although  interest  rates  on certain  types  of preferential
credit  such  as housing  loans  were also  increased,  they were  fixed at below-market  levels.
(ii)  issuing  Govemment  securities. The  Government  started  issuing  bonds  and  treasury  bills as
a form of inducing  asset  holders  to reduce  their monetary  holdings. In December  1990,  the
Government  issued  1-year  treasury  bonds  and  in early-1991  it issued  treasury  bills. Bonds
started  yielding  an effective  interest  rate  of 43.7 percent  per  annum,  and  treasury  bills, an
effective  interest  rate  of 31.1 percent  per  annum.
fact, one can assume  that in the context of Eastern  Europe  the initial increase  in the price level  is exogenous  (determined  by
the adjustment  In relative prices) and if monetary  policy is too restrictive the money market would clear  by adjusting  income
downwards.  This would be the way of  reducing  the demand  for money to the supply level.  The 1991 sharp recession  is
evidonce  of this happening.
j1/  To minimize  the effect of  the increase  in Interest rates on banks balance  sheets, the  authoritias  drafted an 'Old
Loans  Low'  that provides for the change in interest rates on loan contracts agreed to before February 1991.  The only
exceptions  to this Law are the old mortgages  and consumer  loans  which the Parliament  will determine  shortly.-27-
(iii) stimulating prepayment of consumer  and mortgage loans. The Government allowed
consumer  and mortgage borrowers to prepay  their loans at pre-February  1991 interest rates.
In addition and as a way to control inflationary pressures,  the Government  imposed  tight
credit ceilings and increased  reserve  requirements. Credit ceilings  provide for a maximum banking
system nominal credit expansion  of 15 percent between end-December  1990 and end-June 1991
and  for a General  Government  nominal  credit contraction of 16 percent between end-December
1990 and end-June 1991.20 Expansion  in credit was further reduced  by increasing reserve
requirements  on bank liabilities from 5 percent in end-1990 to 7 percent in February 1991.  These
tight credit policies were reinforced bV  the interest rate policy.  The authorities expect that high
interest rates will reduce demand  for credit by making  credit more expensive.
Once  the inflationary expectations subside,  the Government  expects to shift from direct to
indirect monetary control by developing  the domestic and foreign currency interbank markets and
the market for Government  bonds and  treasury bills.  In February,  the authorities liberalized  the
exchange  rate market, and banks were allowed to fix their buying and selling rates according to
market conditions. 2'  The authorities have also established  a domestic currency interbank market.
Since February 1991, the SSB has no longer  been compelled  to deposit its excess deposits with
NBB, 22 and banks  are allowed to borrow and lend from each other at the terms they decide.  The
NBB limited its credit to other banks  to 20 percent of their needs. (This however excludes  NBB
credit used by banks  to finance loans in difficulties.)
However and despite the initial success, some very important credit allocation issues  have
arisen. First, the General  Government  credit ceiling was not met as a result of the General
Government  difficulty in reducing  its deficit and credit to the General  Government  expanded. 23
Second,  banks have allowed enterprises  to capitalize  their interest on loans. This has been the
result of the sharp increase  in interest cost and the sharp recession. Both of these problems
however have resulted in a credit allocation problem: The overall  credit ceilings has been met by
restraining  the credit to the sectors that should be benefitting from more credit, while the sectors
20/ The program  provides  for a significant reduction  in the General  Government  budget deficit from an estimated  outturn
in 1990 of 13 percent  of GDP  to 3.5 percent  In 1991.
21 The NBB  Is not taking positions; it only operates  as a monitoring end information  agency, where  banks have  to report
their foreign exchange  positions  and exchange  rates offered.
22/ The NBB  Is negotiating the repayment  of part of SSB's credits.  But this is difficult  because,  as discussed earlier,
NBB  used  these credits  to finance  commercial  banks' nonperforming  loans.
23/  In addition,  the General  Goverement  also accumulated  arrears  as a way of financing  its deficit.-28-
that should be adjusting--the  General  Government  and public sector enterprises  (PSEs)--have
benefitted from the credit expansion.
C.2. Institutional Measures
To address  the financial system's structural issues  the Government  agreed  with the World
Bank on a two phase program. In the first  phase,  the Government  will: (i) establish a Bank
Consolidation  Company (BCC);  (ii) organize  the merger  of banks;  (iii) establish  a legal  and
regulatory framework; and (iv) restructure banks' bad loan portfolio.  In the second phase,  the
Government  will undertake a financial sector reform based on a study of the financial system to be
started in 1991.
(i) Bank Consolidation  Company. The Government  will establish  this company  as a way of
assuring  direct control of state-owned banks. This measure  is aimed  at ending the
interlocking relationship  between banks and  their clients, which are mostly PSEs. Every PSEs
owning banks  shares will exchange  their shares  for BBCs  shares. This will apply only to
banks  established  as joint-stock companies,  thus excluding  the SSB. The BCC  main
responsibility  will be to undertake  banks' mergers.
(ii) Merger of Banks. The BCC  will merge  the large  number of small banks  into about ten
medium-size  economically  viable banks.  Initially, the BCC  should concentrate on the
institutions that are unable to comply with the new prudential  banking  regulation.
(iii) Legal and Regulatory  Framework. The Grand National  Assembly already passed  the
Accounting and Central  Bank Laws in April and June, respectively. In addition, the
Government  has already  submitted to the Grand  National Assembly  the Banks  and Credit
Activity Law (Banking  Law). Together these laws will provide the legal framework for the
operation  of the financial system.  In concert, the NBB's Banking  Supervision  Department  is
adopting its supervision  standards  in line with market-economies'  standards;  and it is
recruiting new personnel  capable  of undertaking  on- and off-site bank inspections.
(iv) Restructure  of Banks' Bad Loans. To deal with the banks non-performing  loans,  the
Government  has agreed  to provide guarantees  on all the non-performing  loans granted to
enterprises  before December  31, 1990 (estimated  in Leva 17 billion) plus any interest
capitalized on such loans since January 1,1991.  To compensate  the cash-flow effect of the
guarantees,  the banks  will be allowed to capitalize  the interest on NBB deposits. However,-29-
banks  still will be responsible  for collecting the guaranteed  loans  and will be prohibited  from
lending  to enterprises  that are in arrears  with banks.  Later on and based  on portfolio reviews,
the Government  will decided  the guaranteed  loans that will be written off which will be
covered by Government  bonds.
The Government  envisage banks' privatization  as a gradual process. The BCC  will sell bank
shares  to foreign parties or enter into joint ventures  with foreign parties only after the merger
program  has been completed and after proper valuation of banks' shares. Domestic investors, in
addition, will have to await that banks  are financially restructured,  that banks are audited by
independent  auditors and that NBB Supervision  Department  is fully satisfy that the bank in question
is financially viable.
These institutional measures  are in the process  of implementation  and although will take some
time before they become operational,  they constitute a step forward in reforming the financial
system.  The most preoccupying  aspects of these measures  are: (i) the pace of the reform and the
role assigned  to the financial system in the economic  transformation process; and (ii) the proposed
scheme  for restructuring banks' bad loans.  But Bulgaria  is not the only case that has opted for
these measures,  these are common features of the financial  systems' reforms in Eastern  European
countries.  For  this reason, in the following section I turn to the analysis  of alternative  strategies for
reforming the financial system in Eastern  Europe.
D. ALTERNATIVE  STRATEGIES  FOR  REFORMING  THE FINANCIAL  SECTOR
The authorities can decide on two different strategies  for reforming their financial system.
Strategies  differ on the pace of bank restructuring and privatization and on the method for dealing
with the nonperforming loans. The objective in reforming the financial system should be to
transform this  system into an active instrument for accomplishing  a strong supply response. In the
rest of this section I focus on these issues. I discuss  the objectives in reforming  the financial
system and two different strategies for privatizing  banks and for dealing with bank non-performing
loans as well as their pros and cons.
I will argue that to be effective the financial sysem reform strategy should combine a quick
privatization of banks and a scheme  for guaranteeing  of the non-performing  loans.  This strategy
should best l)  ensure efficiency in the allocation  of resources. (Private  restructured banks would
be more efficient in allocating financial resources  to the sectors that would sustain the supply
response);  (ii  exert greater financial discipline  on banks and enterprises. (Banks  would screen  more-30-
efficiently the projects and contribute to the efficiency of enterprise  management.);  and (iii)
minimize  fiscal costs.  (The  essence  of this strategy is to minimize  the use of fiscal resources. A
strategy that relies  on substantial fiscal resources  could result in its postponement  because  fiscal
resources  would be scarce in the early period of the economic transformation.)
D.  1  The QIbiectie  i  Reformina  the Financial  System.
The objective in reforming Eastern  European  countries' financial systems should  be to change
its role in the economy from the passive  role common in centrally-planned  economies,  into the
active role common in market economies. The financial sector reform, in combination with the
enterprise  reform, should lead to a strong supply response  by: (i) developing  an active banking
system that allocates credit efficiently and exerts financial control on enterprises;  and lii) designing
a scheme  for dealing  efficiently with banks' bad loans  and minimizing  their macro-  and micro-
economic  costs.  In contrast, most Eastern  European  countries  that had undertaken  a financial
system reform have opted for a gradual  approach  and for assigning  a passive  role to the financial
system reform in the economic reform program.
A strong supply response  in Eastern  European  countries requires an active banking  system
that performs an efficient allocation of credit and exerts financial control on enterprises. Credit  is a
key element for enterprises  to develop  snd respond  to market incentives. Banks, as enterprises,
should also respond  to the changes in relative prices by allocating  credit to the enterprises  that
would sustain economic growth, while at the same time reducing  their exposure  with the loss-
making enterprises  and enterprises  that are non-viable  at the new relative prices.  By doing this
banks would make credit available  to the viable enterprises  and impose  a hard-budget  constraint on
enterprises. By allocating credit efficiently, banks  would contribute to select the "good'  from the
"bad" enterprises  and would force the "bad" enterprises  into restructuring or liquidation. This
would constitute a radical  change relative to the role assigned  to the banking system in centrally-
planned  economies  where individual banks  have no discretion in the credit allocation.
In Eastern  European  countries, an important contributing element for making the financial
system contribute to the supply response  would be to deal efficiently with banks' bad loans  and
thus, reduce  their macro-  and micro-economic  costs. The existence of a large portion of bad loans
in banks' portfolios could lead to credit miscallocation resulting in an increase  in fiscal costs and
banks  failures.  While the fiscal costs have important macro-economic  consequences,  the banks
failures have important micro-economic  consequences.-31-
The existence  of a large proportion of bad loans in Eastern  European  countries' financial
system could pre-empt the overall  economic transformation by leading  to credit mis-allocation. In
general  and briefly, banks  with a large portion of bad loans would tend to minimize  the income
shortfall that arises  from holding bad loans by: (i) lending to 'bad"  enterprises  as a way of turning
their old bad loans into 'good"  ones and thus avoiding the need  for provisioning  on their bad loans.
This is the well-known 'evergreening  of loans"; and (ii) increasing  their cash-flow by engaging  in
more risky lending and increasing  their spread between their average  lending  and deposit rates.
This, as other countries experiences  shows, 24 pre-empts  the supply response  because  banks
allocate credit to the "bad" enterprises  rather than to the enterprises  that would sustain growth and
because  it crowds-out production and investment of the "good" enterprises  by increasing  the cost
of credit.
This behavior  would result in an increase  in bad loans rather than in its reduction.  Because  in
Eastern  Europe  both banks and enterprises  are publicly-owned,  the increase  in bad loans would
directly result in a larger fiscal cost which would have important macro-economic  consequences.  In
addition, the increase  in banks' bad loans would eventually  make banks  illiquid and lead them into
bankruptcy. The banks' failure in combination with the misallocation  of credit would have very
important micro-economic  consequences. The most evident micro-economic  consequence  would
be the credit misallocation  problem referred  to before, but also important would be savers' and
investors' loss of confidence  resulting from banks' failure.
These  problems  illustrate the importance of designing an efficient strategy for reforming the
financial system.  In particular, the pace of the bank restructuring and  the method for dealing  with
banks' bad loans would determine the role of the financial system in the supply response  and in the
overall  transformation process. I turn to these problems  in the following two sections by
discussing  alternative strategies  for reforming the financial system and  for dealing  with banks' bad
loans. Also important are the establishment of a legal framework that regulates  the banking
activity and an institutional reform for regaining  control of banks {the establishment  of the BCC)  but
these problems  were already  discussed in the context of Bulgaria  and do not need  further
elaboration.
D.2  The Pace of Bank Restructurina  and Privatization
There are two alternative strategies concerning  the pace  of bank restructuring and
24/  For  a review of other countries' experiences  see Hinds (1988), de Juan (1987) and Thorne (1988).-32-
privatization.  The  first is to st. .t the process  of bank  restructuring  and  privatize  them only after
the enterprise  privatization  has  taken  place. The  second  Is  to opt for a quick  privatization  of banks
and  link it to the privatization  of enterprises.  In the first alternative  the emphasis  is on enterprise
restructuring  and  privatization,  and banks  would  play  a passive  role. This  assumes  that the
banking  system  cannot  become  efficient  unless  the enterprise  problems  are  solved. In the second
alternative  the emphasis  Is on the role  of banks  in exerting  a supply  response  and  In contributing  to
solve  the enterprise  problems.  It argues  that this can  be accomplished  by quickly  privatizing  banks
and  restructuring  the financial  system. While  in the first alternative  some  ad-hoc  privatization
agency  should  be  solely  responsible  for controlling  (imposing  a hard-budget  constraint)  enterprises,
in the second  the privatized  banks  in coordination  with the privatization  agency  would  perform  this
role. Banks  would  perform  this task by allocating  credit  exclusively  to creditworthy  enterprises  and
by participating,  in coordination  with the privatization  agency,  in the restructuring  and  privatization
of state-owned enterprises.
Restructure  banlk and then  privatize. This  strategy  is based  on  the contention  that the true
value  of the nonperforming  loans  would  only be certain  when  banks  and  enterprises  are  audited
using  western  standards  and  when  the privatization  and  restructuring  of enterprises  has  taken
place. Only  when  this has  happened  would  the true value  of nonperforming  assets  be  apparent.
The uncertainty  concerning  the true  value  of banks'  nonperforming  assets  and  thus the true value
of the net worth would  prevent  private  investors  from investing  in banks. But more  importantly,  it
would  become  more  costly  for the authorities  to sell  banks  in these  conditions  because  if the
portfolio  is worse  than  anticipated,  then  the portfolio  situation  can  worsen. For  instance,  other
countries'  experience  (mainly  the U.S.)  suggests  that when  banks  with large  nonperforming  loans
are  sold to the private  investors,  their  portfolio  problem  worsened  and  the cost of cleaning  the
nonperforming  portfolio  becomes  more  expensive.  This  is because  and  as aigued  before,  banks
with large  nonperforming  loans  tend  to worsen  the quality  of their  loans  by lending  to their  bad
customers  and engaging  in more  risky  activities.
Because  of these  difficulties,  this strategy  calls  for bank  restructuring  and  their  privatization
when  the true magnitude  of the nonperforming  portfolio  is known. This  could  happen  in about  five
years. A very  important  component  of the restructuring  would  be  the cleaning  up  of the bad
portfolio  and  some  type of recapitalization.  In addition,  the authorities  would  want to merge  some
of the banks  to reduce  the number  of very  small  banks  because  they might  not be  profitable.
Regulation  would  allow  banks  to operate  as  universal  banks. Ownership  of banks  would  be
transferred  to a holding  company  with 100%  public  sector  ownership  participation.  But banks
would  be  run as private  enterprises.  During  the restructuring  period  the authorities  would  work on-33-
overcoming  most of the problems  that made  these banks inefficient.  The most important would be
bringing in new management,  retraining  the existing management  and reorganizing  the banks to be
able to perform efficient risk and liability management. In addition, bank restructuring would be
further stimulated through new regulations  and more stringent supervision.
Quick privatization of banks. This strategy, while recogrizing the problems  with
nonperforming  assets and their effect on the value of bank net worth, considers  that the financial
system is of great importance  for accomplishing  a positive supply response. This can be
accomplished  by segmenting  the banking system into two groups of banks. A first group would be
privatized quickly and would be encouraged  to lend exclusively  to the emerging private sector. A
second  group would be privatized more slowly and would be converted  into investment banks.  The
first group would have the task of allocating credit to the private sector which will be responsible
for sustaining  the supply response,  whale  the second  group of banks (the investment banks) would
have the task of contributing to the restructuring of enterprises. The role of the investment banks
would be to make  the sale of enterprises  or their assets attractive to potential private investors
(e.g., market-maker),  while the Government  agency in charge of enterprise  privatization would be
responsible  for making operative  the Goverment  policies. In fact, the proposed role for the
investment banks  is an attempt at emulating  the role of the U.S. investment banks before  the
Glass-Steagall  Act and of the London  merchant banks.  It is also an attempt in emulating the
successful  role of German  and Japanese  banks  in enterprise  restructuring and privatization. 2"
In the case of Bulgaria,  for instance, the banks chosen  for privatization  could be the 59 CCBs,
while those chosen  for conversion  into investment banks  could be the SCBs. 26  There are two
main reasons  for this.  First, by selecting  the CCBs  for quick privatization, the authorities can
quickly re-organize  the financial system.  This reorganization  can be accomplished  by merging these
banks  before they are privatized into five or six medium size banks. This will allow the authorities
to reduce  the large number  of banks and increase  the size ef banks. But to make bank privatization
more attractive to private buyers, the authorities should allow investors to decide the way banks
would be merged.  SCBs  should be converted into investment banks  because  these banks  can take
advantage  of enterprises' high dependency  on them to impose financial discipline  and force their
j/  For a similar proposal  see Brainard  (1991).  For an  illuminating discussion on the role of  U.S. investment banks
before the Glass-Steagall  Act and of the London  merchant banks see Chernow (1990).  For the role of banks in Germany
and Japan end their role in  enterprise restructuring and privatization see Mayer (1987 and 1990). Corbett (1987) and
Edwards  end Fischer  (1991).
261 Although we illustrate its applicability to Bulgaria.  this strategy can very easily be *:plied to  manV  other Eastern
European  countries. For instance, in Poland  one could select the state-owned commercial  banks for quick privatization  and
the specialized  banks for converting  them into investrnent  banks.-34-
restructuring.  Second,  the CCBs  have  fewer  loans  and  evidence  suggests  that they have  fewer
bad  loans  as well, while SCBs  hold  most total and  bad  loans. This  would  minimize  the immediate
fiscal  cost of the bank  privatization  strategy.
T  his strategy,  unlike  the restructure-and-then-privatize  strategy,  does  not rely  on the valuation
of banks'  bad  loans  (net  worth) as a precondition  for privatization.  It argues  that the authorities
should  be willing  to remove  all loans  that the private  investor  would  classify  as not aood  and  this
should  be  done  at the moment  of privatization.  By leaving  on2v  the good  loans  the authorities
would  assure  a more  efficient  management  of the privatized  banks.  This has  been  an  important
lesson  from other  countries'  experiences  with privatization  of banks. 2'  In addition,  this would
enable  the authorities  to accelerate  the privatization  of banks  because  the pricing  of doubtful  loans
is one  of the most  difficult problems.
The  authorities  can  assure  a quick privatization  of banks  and guaranteeing  the establishment
of solid  banks  by creating  an excess  demand  from private  buyers. Banks  should  be  offered  to
foreign,  domestic  investors  or to any  combination  of the two.  An excess  demand  for private  banks
should  enable  the authorities  to screen  private  buyers  and  could  be accomplished  by limiting  the
number  of banks  and  by offering  incentives.  Such  incentives  should  be the cleaning  of the bad
loans  (as  explained  before)  and removing  any  excess  personnel  (to be negotiated  with private
buyers).  As minimum  conditions,  the authorities  should  require  the private  buyers  to: (i) comply
with the minimum  capital  criteria  by bringing  fresh  money;  (ii) bring  a team  of experienced  bankers;
(iii) observe  all regulations;  (iv) lend  exclusively  to the private  sector;  and  {v) limit their  lending  to
bank  shareholders  and  comply  with loan  concentration  limits  that will be established  in the new
Banking  Law. Similar  criteria  can  be establish  for the later  privatization  of the SCBs.
The  quick privatization  of banks  strategy  has  several  advantages  over  the restructuring  and
later  privatization  of banks  strategy. The  following  are  the moat  important:
(i) more  efficient  allocation  of credit. This  would  be accomplished  by encouraging  the
privatized  banks  to lend  exclusively  to the private  sector  and  thus contributing  to the supply
response.  The  combination  of restructured  banks  under  the control  of the public  sector  (direct  or
indirect)  with very  tight credit  policy  (credit  ceilings)  results  in very little credit  allocated  to the
private  sector. This,  therefore,  results  in crowding  out private  sector  supply  response.  This  has
22  Thie  is a positve  lesson  from the Sponsh  experience  with bank  restructuring  and  a negative  experience  In the  case
of the U.S.  with  the Savings  and Loans.-35-
been the experienced  of other countries  that are more advanced  in their reforms such as Poland.
Three factors contribute to this happening. First, available  financial resources  fall as a
consequence  of the high inflation.  Therefore,  fewer resources  would be available  for lending.
Second,  most of the resources  of the banks in restructuring process  would be frozen in the loss-
making enterprises  and it would be difficult  for these banks  to get repaid.  Moreover, new
regulations  imposing higher capital requirements  and provisioning on loans in difficulties (not yet
classified  as nonperforming)  would make it more difficult for these banks  to recover their loans.
(This is even assuming  that most nonperforming  loans  would be removed.) If banks force
enterprises  to repay  them, enterprises  might decide  to default and banks  would not be able to meet
the capital and provisioning  requirements. But if banks continue lending to these entesprises--
"evergreening  their loans"--in the belief that one day enterprises  would be able to repay  their loans,
then this would allow them to increase  their profits and meet the capital and provisioning
requirements. Third, the public sector would absorb most of the available  financial resources  either
to finance their own deficit, which is difficult to control, or to finance existing preferential  credit
schemes.
Oii)  greater encouragement  to increase  financial savings. Private  banks would be more capable
of regaining  the trust of private savers. It is very likely that privite  savers  would distrust the
banking system because  they lost most of their savings  when the prices were adjusted.  There is
therefore a tendency for private savers  to withdraw from the financial system.  However, the
increase  of savings is a precondition  for accomplishing  a supply response.  The savers' trust can
only be reestablished  by bringing private banks and changing  radically the old f,nancial system.
Moreover, private banks, by bringing new management  and technologies, would offer a greater
range of banking  services in a more competitive environment. In the privatization of banks  strategy
the success  of private banks would depend  on their abi:ity to attract new savings.
(iii) more efficient restructuring of enterprises. This would be accomplished  by segmenting  the
banking  system and forcing bank specialization. First, the private banks would be specialized  in
supporting  the emerging  private sector and providing resources  to investors willing to buy any of
the enterprises  or parts of them.  Second,  the private investment banks would take advantage  of
enterprises  loans to impose  financial discipline  and to influence their managerial  decisions.
Financial  discipline  can be accomplished  by forcing enterprises  that fail to service their debt Into
liquidation  or restructuring. Moreover, these banks can participate in enterprise  privatization by, for
instance, converting these enterprises'  loans into equity at a discount and offering these
enterprises  (or some of their assets)  to potential private investors. This, however, would require  of-36-
close  coordination  with the Government  agency  In charge  of privatization.  One  advantage  of this
system  would  be  to accelerate  the process  of onterprise privatization  by avoid.ng  the liquidation  of
property through  foreclosures.  In fact, this imitates  the experience  of Germany  and  Japan  of
enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization.
(iv)  more  efficient  risk management.  Banks  run by private  owners,  needless  to say, would  be
more  efficient  In minimizing  risk and  more  capable  of bringing  in new management.  This  results
from the fact that it would  be private  investors'  capital  which is at stake. It is arguable  whether
the appointed  managers  and  board  of directors  of banks  in the strategy  to restructure  banks  first
and  then  privatize  would  have  similar  behavior.
There  are,  however,  risks  in pursuirg  this bank  privatization  strategy  which  are  important  to
discuss. First  is the risk of banks  accumulating  bad  loans  as a result  of the economic  instability
during  the transition  to a market  economy. During  this period  there  will be great  confusion  among
enterprises  and  vory  likely  some  will  fail.
Second  is the risk  of not finding  private  buyers  for these  banks. This  could  be because  the
private  sector  is very small  or there  are  few experienced  bankers  or the private  sector  might  not
have  sufficient  resources  to buy  a bank. Moreover,  it could  be  argued  that the individuals  who
own the resources  would  not be  suitable  bankers  becaus3  they accumulated  their  wealth  in an
illegal  way. The  strategy  provides  some  flexibility  by allowing  both  domestic  and  foreign  investors
to be  buyers. If the availability  of resources  is the constraint,  the authorities  can  propose  some
joint ventures  with other  domestic  and  foreign  buyers,  or they can  develop  a scheme  that would
enable  potential  buyers  to procure  the resources.
Third  is the risk of private  banks  not finding  enough  creditworthy  private  enterprises.  Perhaps
this is a more  serious  prob!em  because  banks  in the restructuring  process  would  find difficult  to
assess  risk  and because  private  enterprises  would  have  very  few assets  that can  be used  as
collateral.  However,  the authorities  could  advance  several  schemes  to minimize  this problem. For
instance,  one  is to establish  a register  of creditworthy  private  entrepreneurs  that banks  can  easily
access  through  direct  computer  lines. Also, banks  car.  he allowed  to use  other  assets  as
collaterals.
28/ This wa  also  the experience  of some  U.S.  banks  before  the 1930s. such  as of the J.P. Morgan  Bank. For  a
illuminating  account  of the role of this bank  in the consolidation  and restructuring  process  of U.S.  firms,  see Chernow
(1990).-37-
D.3 Strateales,  for Dealling  with Bank  Non-Performing  Loans.
In dealing  with non-performing  loans  there  are  also  two alternatives.  The  authorities  could
either  remove  nonperforming  loans  from banks'  balance  sheets  and  transfer  them  to a new
institution  responsible  for their  collection,  or provide  guarantees  on  banks'  nonperforming  loans  and
leave  them  as off-balance  sheet  items.
Removing  nonperforming loans. There  are two objectives for removing  completely
nonperforming  loans from banks.  First, it avoids  possible moral hazard  problems. The co-existence
of good and bad clients in the same bank could lead good clients turning into bad ones. It would
be difficult for bankers to impose  financial discipline  on their good clients while allowing more
flexibility to their bad clients.  Second,  it makes  bank efficiency more transparent. Bank efficiency
would depend  on managers  ability to manage  risk and on their lending  practices and not on their
ability to collect loans that were provided  under very different management  and for political
purposes. The major disadvantage  is that this strategy could be very expensive  because  once
these nonp3rforming  loans are removed, it would be very difficult to collect them.
Guaranteeing  nonperforming loans.  The objectives for guaranteeing  are also two.  First,
impose  financial discipline  on all borrowers and use this pressure  to force the  restructuring of
enterprises. This can only be done by linking the bank (the investment banks)  and enterprise
restructuring processes.  Otherwise enterprises  would not be stimulated to restructure.  Second,
minimize  the fiscal costs of dealing  with the nonperforming  loans.  This can be done by offering
price incentives to banks  that collect the nonperforming  loans.  For instance, banks can earn a
commission  on the amount collected.  However, this price incentive should be offered to the
investment  banks that become private.  This would constitute an additional incentive for investors
to take a portion of the nonperforming  assets. The major disadvantages  are the moral hazard
problem and the lack of transparency  in bank management. 2 '
While both schemes  differ in terms of the where to put the loans,  they are similar in how to
convert the banks bad loans into public sector debt.  First, the authorities should cloan up NBB's
deposits that are guaranteeing  SCBs  nonperforming  loans, and BFTB's  foreign exchange  losses  by
29/  This scheme differs  in several ways from the one proposed by  the  Bulgarian  authorities:  (i} it  only provides
guarantees  and does not combine them with Government  bonds;  ,ii) it does not allows the interest capitalization  on bad
loans or on NBB deposits on banks;  (iii) it  onables  banks in direct negotiation with their client enterpriso to  decide the
portion of the loans  to  be written off,  whereas  in the case  of Bulgaria  the enterprise  res.ructuring agency  decides  the portion
of the loan to be written off;  and (iv) it combines  incentives  for collecting the nonperforming  loans with private property of
banks.-38-
substituting NBB's  deposits held by SCBs  and BFTB's  foreign exchange  losses  for two types of
Government  bonds. The authorities should issue the first typo of bonds to remove NBB's deposits
held by SCBs and  thus isolate monetary policy from the size of enterprises' nonperforming  loans.
By doing this the authorities would convert NBB's  deposits held by SCBs  into public sector
domestic debt.  The second  t4,pe  of bonds would be a device for transferring the public sector
foreign debt held by the BFTB  to the Treasury.  The authorities should substitute BFTB's  foreign
exchange  liabilities  and foreign exchange  losses  for Government  bonds. This measure  would
effectively transfer the cost of the foreign exchange  losses  to the Budget and would enable BFTB
to operate  like any other commercial  bank.
The key difference  between the two schemes  would be the treatment of banks'
nonperforming  loans. In the option that removes  all the nonperforming  loans, commercial  banks
would transfer them to a newly-established  institution specialized  in collecting the bad  loans.  In
this option banks would transfer both the nonperforming  bad loans  and the NBB  deposits.  In the
option that guarantees  the nonperforming  loans,  banks would simply shift both the nonperforming
loans  and NBB  deposits  to an off-balance  sheet item.  Any amount that banks  collect on these
nonperforming  loans is then transferred directly to the budget because  the Treasury already
covered the NBB  for the amount of its deposits.
The option that removes  completely  bank nonperforming  loans has several disadvantages
over the one that only provides  a guarantee. First, a new institution would be created that knows
very little about the history of these bad loans, whereas the other option would take advantage  of
the old bank-client  relationship  by leaving the bad loans with the original bank. Second,  this new
institution would lack banking experience. Their employees  would be para-statal and lack the
incentives provided  by private enterprises. (In contrast, in the guarantee  option, experienced
private bankers  would be responsible  for collecting these loans). Third, the price incentive system
would be absent in the option that removes  the nonperforming  loans. It would be difficult to
establish  a price incentive system in a para-statal  institution, whereas  in the guarantee  option price
incentives would play a key role in encouraging  the collection of bad loans.
E. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have described  and analyzed  the problems  confronted by Eastern  European
countries and offered some altematives for their solution.  I have illustrated these problAms  by
analyzing  the Bulgarian  financial system.  In the description of the condition of the financial system
the importance  of the inherited problems  is apparent, which makes  the reform of the financial-39-
system  particularly  difficult. The Bulgarian  authorities  have  attempted  to correct  the short-term
problems,  but most  of the identified  structural  issues  remain. Correction  of these  issues  requires
an overall  reform  of the financial  system. The best  way to correct  these  problems  is by opting  for
a quick  privatization  of banks  and linking  the bank  and  enterprise  restructuring  processes.  The
advantage  of this strategy  is that it would  foster the needed  supply  response.-40-
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ANNEX 1: A NOTE  ON FINANCIAL  DATA PROBLEMS
The paper's analysis is based  on banks' reported balance  sheets  and financial statements.
However, as is recognized  in Bulgaria,  these data are subject to several  flaws which arise from:
(i) differences In accounting plans. Banks  accounting  plans in Bulgaria  are different from
those in western countries.  This raises  the issues  of classification and interpretation.
Presently,  in Bulgaria,  there are three different accounting  plans: one for the National  Bank of
Bulgaria  (NBB);  another for the Bulgarian  Foreign  Trade Bank (BFTB);  and another  for the
Commercial  Banks. These  differences, no doubt, caused  the poor quality of the data.
(ii\ asset and liabilities valuations. Assets and liabilities valuation is another source of
problems,  as it introduces distortions in bank balance  sheets.  It is particularly  a problem with
fixed assets, loans and foreign currency operations. Fixed  assets, e.g., real estate, have
experienced  a surge in prices which is unaccounted  for in bank balance  sheets; banks  are
carrying a large proportion of nonperforming  loans which are not provisioned  for; and foreign
currency  operations  are valued at the official exchange  rate while such transactions take place
at the more depreciated  commercial  exchange  rate.  In addition, banks  hold substantial
volumes of unsettled assets and liabilities  due to delays in the clearing  system.  These
unsettled assets and liabilities have had the consequence  of overstating the true size  of bank
balance  sheets.
(iii) macroeconomic  distortions.  Macroeconomic  distortions consist of price, interest
rates and exchange  rate controls.  These  controls affect bank balance  sheets and financial
statements by distorting assets and liabilities' true value.
In cases where data is weak, I avoided  comparisons  with other countries or refrained  from
using  the data,  and in cases where sources of problems  were known, I made  corrections.
Conclusions  based  on this data should be regarded  as preliminary  and further verified when more
robust data is available.Policy Research Working  Paper  Series
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